Remembering: The Constitution and Federally
Funded Apartheid
Joy Milligan†
For much of the twentieth century, the U.S. government authorized and invested heavily in segregation and racial inequality. Often it did so through federal
programs authorized under Congress’s Spending Clause powers. Federal spending
allowed powerful national investments in areas like health, education, and housing
but frequently created segregated hospitals, schools, and communities. From the
New Deal onward, Black leaders pressed constitutional arguments to hold the federal government responsible for its role in deepening racial inequality. Early on,
federal lawyers and administrators recognized the strength of those arguments but
explicitly decided against halting federal involvement in Jim Crow.
Decades later, the civil rights advocates prevailed. By the 1970s, the federal
courts overwhelmingly agreed that the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection component barred federal subsidies or support for racial discrimination. The same “noaid” principle was codified in the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964. However, from
the 1980s onward, this hard-won constitutional mandate became increasingly difficult to enforce, blocked by judicially constructed procedural obstacles. The substantive Fifth Amendment ideal of preventing the federal government from aiding systemic discrimination receded because of increasing challenges to its substance,
judicial fatigue with institutional oversight, and the sweeping scope of the problem—along with collective amnesia regarding the prior decades of constitutional
struggle.
This Article reveals that forgotten constitutional history. After excavating the
Fifth Amendment struggles, I argue that the no-aid norm, and the underlying reality
of long-term federal participation in racial apartheid, should be remembered and
debated once again. The costs of forgetting the constitutional principle and its history are significant: Civil rights frameworks have been distorted, leaving no systemic
check or means of redress for the discriminatory use of federal funds. Further, the
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nation’s constitutional memory and deliberations have been shortchanged, leaving
us unable to reckon with the past honestly and adequately. Our polity should again
debate federal constitutional responsibility for Spending Clause programs, and, in
doing so, confront the nation’s obligation to repair the apartheid it once bankrolled.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1995, Black families from Baltimore sued the federal government for violating their constitutional rights.1 They charged
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) with
having “deliberately created and perpetuated systemic racial segregation” throughout Baltimore’s public housing program, in cooperation with local officials, beginning in the 1930s and for many
decades afterward.2 The Thompson v. HUD3 plaintiffs argued that
the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection mandate barred federal
administrators from approving and funding systemic discrimination within the federally subsidized public housing program. They
also asserted that the Constitution required the federal government to remedy those long-running violations, by “eliminat[ing]
the vestiges of unlawful segregation ‘root and branch.’” 4
Such arguments regarding federal constitutional obligations
may seem intuitive, but they are almost never litigated. Relatively few cases address such claims; almost all that do are decades
old.5 Scholarship largely passes over them.6
1

Thompson v. HUD, 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 432–33, 436 (D. Md. 2005).
Class Action Complaint ¶¶ 1–9, 37, Thompson, 348 F. Supp. 2d 398 (No. MJG 95-309).
3
348 F. Supp. 2d 398 (D. Md. 2005).
4
Class Action Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 2–6, 252; see also Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (describing the post-Brown mandate “to
eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation”); Green v.
Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437–38 (1968) (charging segregated school districts with “the
affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system
in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch”).
5
See infra Part III (discussing cases decided between the 1960s and 1980s).
6
Academics have probed the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection mandate (and, in
some instances, its link to Spending Clause programs), but they have not traced the overall
path of Fifth Amendment no-aid arguments by civil rights advocates and the courts’ response, as this Article does. In 2004, Professor Richard Primus asked why the Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), doctrine—which incorporates the equal protection mandate
against the federal government—had done little to constrain federal actors. Richard A.
Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 977–78 (2004) (citing Bolling, 347 U.S. at
500). Leading legal historians have highlighted agencies’ distinctive understandings of
their Fifth Amendment equal protection obligations. See generally SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE
WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT (2014) (revealing historical struggles among activists, lawyers, and agencies over the Constitution’s application
to the workplace); Karen M. Tani, Administrative Equal Protection: Federalism, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Rights of the Poor, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 825 (2015) (tracing
how the federal Social Security Board interpreted its equal protection obligations over
time). Of particular relevance, Professor Sophia Lee has traced agencies’ evolving application of the Fifth Amendment no-aid norm to the employment practices of those they licensed or regulated. See generally Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799 (2010).
Professor Olatunde Johnson has extensively mapped the role of Spending Clause mandates in promoting civil rights and racial equality. See generally Olatunde C.A. Johnson,
Lawyering That Has No Name: Title VI and the Meaning of Private Enforcement, 66 STAN.
2
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That constitutional silence is puzzling. Federal actors played
an extensive role in subordinating Black Americans and other racial minorities during the twentieth century.7 Much of that participation occurred via federal Spending Clause authority—i.e.,
Congress’s power to provide federal funds in exchange for states’
and localities’ participation in far-reaching social programs and
linked regulatory mandates.8
Spending Clause programs allowed federal intervention in
the spheres of education, health, housing, employment, and others traditionally thought reserved for state and local governance.9
Until the late twentieth century, such programs often involved
explicit federal authorization and funding for segregated or

L. REV. 1293 (2014) (discussing enforcement of these mandates and their application in
the contexts of school desegregation, public transit, and school discipline); Olatunde C.A.
Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General: Equality Directives in American Law, 87
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339 (2012) (examining administrative enforcement of these mandates in
housing and transportation); Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
374 (2007) (arguing for strengthening such mandates’ mode of addressing racial disparities). Recently, Professors Cristina Isabel Ceballos, David Engstrom, and Daniel Ho have
highlighted the troubling consequences of judicial nonreviewability of disparate impact
claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.), which stems from the same line of D.C. Circuit
cases that I probe in Part IV. See Cristina Isabel Ceballos, David Freeman Engstrom &
Daniel E. Ho, Disparate Limbo: How Administrative Law Erased Antidiscrimination, 131
YALE L.J. __ (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 39–55) (on file with author). A substantial
literature interrogates whether or not the Fifth Amendment is correctly interpreted to
contain an equal protection mandate. See generally Gary Lawson, Guy I. Seidman & Robert
G. Natelson, The Fiduciary Foundations of Federal Equal Protection, 94 B.U. L. REV. 415
(2014); Peter J. Rubin, Taking its Proper Place in the Constitutional Canon: Bolling v.
Sharpe, Korematsu, and the Equal Protection Component of Fifth Amendment Due Process, 92 VA. L. REV. 1879 (2006); David E. Bernstein, Bolling, Equal Protection, Due Process, and Lochnerphobia, 93 GEO. L.J. 1253 (2005); Kenneth L. Karst, The Fifth Amendment’s Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C. L. REV. 541 (1977).
7
Scholars and journalists have begun forcing the record into public consciousness.
See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 54–55 (1993). See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN,
THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED
AMERICA (2017); Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, THE ATLANTIC (June 2014),
https://perma.cc/N675-ZKST.
8
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (empowering Congress “to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States”); Steward Mach.
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585–93 (1937) (upholding the Social Security Act’s unemployment compensation scheme as use of spending power).
9
See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause
After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861, 864 (2013) (“An enormous amount of the New Deal/Great
Society state is built on conditional spending statutes.”); ROBERT JAY DILGER & MICHAEL
H. CECIRE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40638, FEDERAL GRANTS TO STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 15–27 (2019)
(tracing the history of federal grants); V.O. KEY, JR., THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL
GRANTS TO STATES, 380–85 (1937) (providing an early study of grants-in-aid).
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otherwise discriminatory institutions.10 If those federal actions involved sweeping violations of the Constitution, that would drastically alter our understanding of the past. If the federal government systematically violated its equal protection obligations, it
might face significant legal responsibility to repair the resulting
harms.
Black-letter law supports such claims. While the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause governs only state and local governments, the Fifth Amendment’s due process guarantee
imposes an equivalent nondiscrimination mandate on federal actors.11 Equal protection doctrine bars not just direct discrimination by state actors but also intentional participation in others’
discrimination.12 Longstanding precedent also requires state actors to undo de jure segregation that they have constructed—an
obligation that continues until the remaining effects of that segregation have been remedied.13
Why, then, are Fifth Amendment claims like those in Thompson so rare? How is the modern constitutional record so sparse if
federal constitutional responsibility might be so extensive?
In this Article, I probe that constitutional silence, revealing
an overlooked and unsettling constitutional history. Throughout
the twentieth century, civil rights activists fought to stop federal
agencies from approving and subsidizing Jim Crow. Eventually,
they succeeded in establishing a clear constitutional prohibition

10 For documentation across various sectors, see generally U.S. COMM’N ON C.R.,
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN FARM PROGRAMS (1965); CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN
NEIGHBORS: A STUDY OF PREJUDICE IN HOUSING (1955); ROBERT C. WEAVER, THE NEGRO
GHETTO (1948); Memorandum from Roy Wilkins, Chairman, Leadership Conf. on C.R., &
Arnold Aronson, Sec’y, Leadership Conf. on C.R., Proposals for Executive Action to End
Federally Supported Segregation and Other Forms of Racial Discrimination (Aug. 29,
1961) (on file with National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Md., RG
235, Box 133, Secretary’s Correspondence). See also DESMOND KING, SEPARATE AND
UNEQUAL: BLACK AMERICANS AND THE US FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 172–202 (1995).
11 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975); Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499.
12 Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 466–67 (1973). In Norwood, the Court ruled
that intentional funding of segregation violates the Constitution, even if the funding is not
motivated by racial animus. On the relationship of Norwood with the Court’s later decisions in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), see infra notes 316–26 and accompanying text.
13 See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 458–61 (1979); Dayton
Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 537 (1979); Swann, 402 U.S. at 15; Green, 391
U.S. at 438; Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). Though the Supreme Court
indicated in the 1990s that the remedial obligation ends once remedies have been implemented for “a reasonable period,” it did not question the obligation itself. Bd. of Educ. v.
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991).
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on federal support for racial segregation and other forms of discrimination: a no-aid principle.14
However, advocates soon saw their legal successes fade away.
No court ever overruled the Fifth Amendment norm on the merits. Instead, from the late 1970s onward, courts erected a series
of procedural obstacles, making it nearly impossible to litigate
such Fifth Amendment claims against the federal government.
Conservative and liberal judges both signed off on the relevant
doctrines. As the constitutional claim became unenforceable, the
Fifth Amendment norm faded from the judicial record.15
I argue that silencing the Fifth Amendment via procedural
means has been extremely costly. As a practical matter, past and
present federal investments in discrimination are nearly impossible to challenge or remedy in any systemic way. The less visible
costs are still more fundamental: Doing away with a key equal
protection principle without a substantive reckoning has distorted our historical understandings and shortchanged our constitutional deliberations. It is rarely argued that the federal government long violated the Constitution, or that federal
authorities might bear significant legal responsibility to remedy
our racially segregated and unequal society in the present.16
***
In the Baltimore litigation, the district court avoided a clear
answer on the federal government’s constitutional obligations.
Following a decade of litigation in Thompson, the court issued
a 127-page opinion on liability in January 2005.17 Finding
14 See, e.g., DONA COOPER HAMILTON & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, THE DUAL AGENDA:
RACE AND SOCIAL WELFARE POLICIES OF CIVIL RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS 90–108 (1997). I
employ the phrase “no-aid” in this Article as a shorthand for the theory that the Constitution bars the federal government from knowingly aiding others in carrying out racial discrimination. That usage differs from the phrase’s meaning in the Establishment Clause
context, though the two ideas are arguably similar. For more on the comparisons between
the race and religion-based contexts, see infra notes 194–97, 283–85, 330 and accompanying text; Joy Milligan, Religion and Race: On Duality and Entrenchment, 87 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 393, 403–58 (2012) (contrasting the historical arcs of race and religion doctrine under
the Constitution).
15 In Professor Lawrence Sager’s famous terminology, the Fifth Amendment no-aid
mandate has become a judicially “underenforced norm.” Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure:
The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1221 (1978).
16 See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, “Social Engineering”: Notes on the Law and Political
Economy of Integration, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1149, 1155–56 (2019) (noting amnesia regarding the federal government’s role in producing segregation).
17
Thompson, 348 F. Supp. 2d 398. For further background on the Thompson litigation, see john a. powell, Structural Racism: Building Upon the Insights of John Calmore,
86 N.C. L. REV. 791, 808–09 (2008) (describing author’s role as expert witness in the
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HUD liable under the Fair Housing Act18 for “fail[ing] to consider
regionally-oriented desegregation and integration policies” to undo
the segregation that it had helped create, Judge Sidney Garbis
addressed but did not fully resolve the underlying constitutional
questions.19
The court held that the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claims
against HUD based on the agency’s unfulfilled duty to undo past
intentional segregation were legally viable and that the plaintiffs
could enforce that duty.20 Until 1954, the city of Baltimore, with
the federal government’s support, “housed Blacks and Whites in
different and separated developments” by law.21 HUD’s authorization and funding had been crucial in constructing those patterns. To date, HUD had “failed to take adequate action to disestablish the vestiges of the discrimination they had participated in
imposing.”22 However, the court declined to formally resolve
whether HUD had violated the Fifth Amendment, suggesting
that its ruling that HUD was liable under the Fair Housing Act
might provide sufficient remedies, making it unnecessary to
reach the constitutional question.23 The case was tried on the remaining factual and remedial questions in 2006, but no final ruling was issued. Instead, the Thompson plaintiffs and HUD
reached a remedial settlement in 2012, designing a set of fair
housing remedies for the greater Baltimore region.24
Why did the Baltimore court grapple with but ultimately refuse to answer the Fifth Amendment question? It almost certainly
did so to avoid addressing issues that appear clear-cut in older
litigation); Florence Wagman Roisman, Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing in Regional
Housing Markets: The Baltimore Public Housing Desegregation Litigation, 42 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 333, 353–59 (2007) (outlining the court’s opinion and supplemental proceedings).
18 Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1970).
19 Thompson, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 462–63.
20 Id. at 414, 420. The court explained the continuing duty to remedy past segregation as follows: “[I]f Plaintiffs demonstrate an affirmative and purposeful segregatory action by Defendants in the administration of housing policy that took place prior to the
[limitations] Period, such conduct may obligate Defendants to disestablish the vestiges of
the discrimination they imposed.” Id. at 414. Federal officials could be liable for failing to
take such remedial steps “regardless of their intent.” Id. at 415.
21 Id. at 443.
22 Id.
23 Thompson, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 451 & n.106. The court also noted that it was unclear
if it would need to find that discriminatory intent drove HUD’s remedial failures, ruling that
it would hear evidence of discriminatory intent during the litigation’s remedial phase. Id. at
451. But see id. at 415 (“Equal Protection liability lies if Plaintiffs further demonstrate that
Defendants, regardless of their intent, failed to fulfill [their remedial duties].” (emphasis
added)). For a discussion of the discriminatory intent doctrine, see infra Part II.C.
24 See Alex Wohl, Court Approves Final Settlement Thompson v. HUD, HUD
ARCHIVES (Nov. 20, 2012), https://perma.cc/TA9Q-WENT.
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doctrine but have faded from current case law—an instance of
constitutional avoidance that skirted looming, weighty questions
of federal responsibility.
Until the late twentieth century, the U.S. government explicitly authorized and invested in segregation and racial inequality.
It did so through federal programs authorized under Congress’s
Spending Clause powers, enabling sweeping improvements in
areas like health, education, and housing, while creating enduringly segregated hospitals, schools, and communities. Black leaders challenged the federal government’s role in deepening racial
inequality, explicitly arguing that such federal acts violated the
Constitution.25 Within the federal government, lawyers and administrators recognized the strength of those arguments but
nonetheless authorized continued federal support for Jim Crow.
For decades, neither courts nor policymakers were willing to confront the ways in which federal Spending Clause programs conflicted with equal protection ideals. The constitutional question of
federal responsibility was too inconvenient; confronting it headon could have threatened liberals’ goal of expanding national social programs, which required southern Democrats’ support.26
In the 1960s, civil rights leaders finally triumphed. The
courts and Congress ventured an answer: Yes, the Fifth Amendment did have something to say on this question. Federal officials
were barred from approving and funding segregation and other
forms of systemic racial discrimination. The judiciary arrived at
this position through direct constitutional interpretation, while
Congress enacted a statutory version of the mandate in Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.27 Title VI barred race and national
origin discrimination in federally funded programs and gave federal officials the power to halt funding to any state, local, or private entity that persisted in discriminating.28 Later statutes

25 See infra Part I.B. For detailed accounts of those campaigns in particular areas,
see generally Joy Milligan, Plessy Preserved: Agencies and the Effective Constitution, 129
YALE L.J. 924 (2020) [hereinafter Plessy Preserved]; Joy Milligan, Subsidizing Segregation, 104 VA. L. REV. 847 (2018) [hereinafter Subsidizing Segregation].
26 See, e.g., IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD
HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 18–23 (2005); KING,
supra note 10, at 20–27; ROBERT C. LIEBERMAN, SHIFTING THE COLOR LINE: RACE AND THE
AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 7–9 (1998); JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: HOW
RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY 20–21 (1996); Ira Katznelson, Kim Geiger &
Daniel Kryder, Limiting Liberalism: The Southern Veto in Congress, 1933–1950, 108 POL.
SCI. Q. 283, 283, 297 & n.32 (1993).
27 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d); see also infra Part II.B; infra Part III.
28 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 600, 601, 78 Stat. at 252 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(d)).
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applied the Title VI approach to other forms of discrimination in
federally funded programs, creating a legal framework of civil
rights protections across all national programs resting on Spending Clause authority. These are what I term the “Spending Clause
civil rights statutes.”29
It thus became black-letter law that all federal Spending
Clause programs—most of the national social welfare state—gave
rise to federal constitutional obligations to avoid knowingly supporting others’ discrimination. In the same period, courts construed equal protection principles to require government actors
to undo de jure segregation that they had created.30 Through the
1970s, courts often applied the Fifth Amendment and Title VI in
parallel to bar federal involvement in systemic discrimination by
others and to require federal remediation.31
Those legal triumphs proved ephemeral. Beginning in the
1980s, courts made the Fifth Amendment no-aid norm extremely
difficult to enforce, while describing the legal framework and its
history in ways that erased the substantive norm itself.32 By then,
a conservative legal movement had succeeded in limiting the substantive reach of the Equal Protection Clause, rendering the noaid principle vulnerable to challenge on the merits. But the federal courts did not explicitly confront the deep tensions that had
emerged within constitutional doctrine.
Instead, courts relied on procedural barriers that sharply restricted plaintiffs’ ability to enforce the Fifth Amendment principle against federal actors themselves. The Supreme Court sharpened its doctrine around standing, implied private rights of
action, and reviewability under the Administrative Procedure
Act33 (APA). The D.C. Circuit, a key site for suits challenging federal involvement in discrimination, constructed further barriers
to such litigation, with other federal courts following suit.
Advocates’ success in codifying the Fifth Amendment norm
in Title VI and its sibling statutes proved double-edged. The very

29 See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794) (barring disability discrimination in executive branch and federally funded programs); Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318,
§ 901, 86 Stat. 235, 373–74 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681) (barring sex discrimination in
federally funded education programs); see also Guardians Ass’n v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 463
U.S. 582, 620 n.9 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (listing eight additional nondiscrimination provisions in other statutes that were modeled upon Title VI).
30 See infra Part II.D.
31 See infra Part III.A.
32 See infra Part IV.
33 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559; see also infra Part IV.A.
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existence of those statutes allowed courts and others to ignore the
underlying constitutional mandate insofar as it operated against
federal officials. Courts interpreted the Spending Clause civil
rights statutes to allow litigants to sue only the recipients of federal funds—not to bring claims against federal officials themselves for authorizing and funding systemic discrimination.34
Those decisions obscured the Fifth Amendment principle, focusing only on the state or local actors that ultimately engaged in
discrimination, rather than on federal support for their actions.
The net result was that courts allowed federal agencies to decide
whether or not to abide by the mandate, giving them discretion to
fund known, systemic discrimination as they chose.
Why did the judiciary render the Fifth Amendment principle
so difficult to enforce? Multiple, interrelated causes were at work:
the growing conservativism of the courts, judicial fatigue with intervention in other institutions, a sense that Congress and the
executive had sufficiently addressed the Fifth Amendment norm
through statutory codification, and, over time, a failure to recognize or remember the constitutional principle at all.35 Liberals
themselves acquiesced in shutting off Fifth Amendment enforcement, all too aware that constitutional interpretation could just
as easily inhibit progressive implementation of civil rights goals
as it could propel such reforms.36
Constitutional silence regarding the Fifth Amendment has
allowed courts to avoid difficult questions of constitutional law,
but such avoidance inflicts costs. Silencing debate over the Fifth
Amendment’s content as it pertains to federal spending authority
allows evasion and amnesia regarding key aspects of our nation’s
past and history.
Specific, troubling consequences result. Most starkly, it is
nearly impossible to enforce the Fifth Amendment obligation
against the federal government. With the constitutional mandate
papered over, the legal regime that persists is one of executive
discretion. The Constitution no longer mandates active supervision to ensure that federal funds do not fuel inequality.
Constitutional silence also impedes efforts to undo inequality
rooted in longstanding patterns of discrimination. The no-aid
principle barred the federal government from intentionally helping to construct a segregated society. Nonetheless, the government did so. The black-letter law of constitutional remedies
34
35
36

See infra Part IV.B; infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part IV.B; infra Part V.A.
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suggests that the federal government must dismantle the segregation it helped to install. Thus, the no-aid principle theoretically
could be relied upon, along with Fourteenth Amendment remedial principles, as the basis for a constitutional mandate to undo
those harms—just as the Thompson plaintiffs argued. And if the
federal government were to voluntarily attempt to remedy the
apartheid it long supported, the Fifth Amendment might protect
its actions from constitutional attack. But the obscurity of the
constitutional principle, and the history underlying it, leaves
those remedial implications largely unexplored.
Constitutional silence also distorts public memory, with troubling implications for law and policy. As constitutional scholars
have noted, our memories and the histories we draw upon shape
how we interpret our most fundamental legal and moral commitments.37 The constitutional no-aid principle emerged from a long
fight over the conflict between the federal government’s expansive use of Spending Clause powers for social goals and the ways
in which the resulting programs undermined equal protection
principles. That clash—between the New Deal state’s promise of
improving the general welfare and the Reconstruction Amendments’
commitment to racial equality—has never been resolved. Public
policy and public memory still do not grasp the federal role in
deepening racial apartheid in America, which was inextricably
linked to progressive triumphs in creating national programs to
aid the poor and working class.
Retracing the struggle to construct a no-aid principle thus reminds us of several key truths about the reality of federal power
and its impact upon inequality. First, the federal government was
not a bystander to Jim Crow, whether in the North or South, nor
is federal spending an unalloyed force for “liberal” outcomes.
Building national social programs entailed investing

37 See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Turning the Angel: The Uses of Critical Legal History,
1 FREEDOM CTR. J. 45, 59 (2009) (arguing that legal historians should reflect on the past
with a forward-looking eye “so that redemption and repair are tied together with the imaginative leaps into the possible”); Richard A. Primus, Judicial Power and Mobilizable
History, 65 MD. L. REV. 171, 196 (2006) (concluding that “[w]e all form our notions of the
core commitments of constitutional law partly under the influence of thematic conceptions
of American history”); Reva B. Siegel, Collective Memory and the Nineteenth Amendment:
Reasoning About “the Woman Question” in the Discourse of Sex Discrimination, in
HISTORY, MEMORY, AND THE LAW 131, 133 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearnes eds., 1999)
(utilizing the “collective memory” of American gender relations to interpret the Constitution); Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism, Reconstruction, and the Problem of Collective Memory, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 1998 (2003) (suggesting that “national narratives . . . regulat[e] the collective memory of a nation’s
fundamental commitments”).
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systematically in racial apartheid.38 The Fifth Amendment no-aid
principle was constructed as a challenge to that reality—recovering it should force us to recall the underlying history more accurately. Second, the federal Spending Clause power is too sprawling and massive to allow it to go unmonitored by the
Constitution.39 The historical example highlights that reality.
Presently, the federal courts are unlikely to be sympathetic
to attempts to revitalize the Fifth Amendment. Overcoming the
current constitutional silence likely has to begin outside the
courts.
The act of remembering—of recalling federal complicity in Jim
Crow and the constitutional response that civil rights advocates
forged—is vital. Shifting activists’ and broader society’s attention
toward that history, and that history’s impact on our fundamental
law, could help ground a renewed recognition that the Constitution
should be read to constrain the Spending Clause power and to
require remediation—even now, forty years after the key decisions emerged mandating that duty to dismantle American apartheid.40 Popular constitutionalism might again breathe life into the
Fifth Amendment norm, by shifting public memory and, with it,
legal actors’ understandings.41
The rest of the Article is organized as follows. Part I lays the
backdrop, explaining the federal welfare state’s deep conflicts
with equal protection norms and how activists drew upon the

38 See, e.g., KATZNELSON, supra note 26, at 42–79, 113–41 (detailing racial exclusion
within the Social Security system, the workplace, and veterans’ assistance programs);
HARVARD SITKOFF, A NEW DEAL FOR BLACKS: THE EMERGENCE OF CIVIL RIGHTS AS A
NATIONAL ISSUE 45–53 (1978) (detailing racial discrimination in New Deal programs); see
also supra notes 10, 14, 26.
39 Over $700 trillion in federal funds flowed to state and local governments in 2019,
well over 3% of GDP and representing almost a third of state government budgets. See
OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HIST. TABLES, tbl. 12.1, https://perma.cc/ERZ5-5VMD; NAT’L
ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, 2020 STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT 3,
https://perma.cc/56JC-2VZX.
40 See Swann, 402 U.S. at 1; Green, 391 U.S. at 438.
41 On the powerful role of constitutional rhetoric and rights claims in social movements, see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002);
Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence of
Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740 (2014); Douglas NeJaime, The Legal Mobilization Dilemma, 61 EMORY L.J. 663 (2012); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007); and Reva
B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change:
The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006). Cf. Tomiko Brown-Nagin,
Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 1436, 1445 (2005) (arguing that mass mobilization is a prerequisite to constitutional
change in the courts).
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Fifth Amendment as a source of constitutional constraint. Part II
shows courts’ reluctance to police federal involvement in racial
discrimination through the early 1960s and then examines the
statutory and doctrinal breakthroughs that laid the foundation
for the no-aid principle to emerge as black-letter law. Part III describes the roughly two-decade period from the late 1960s
through the 1980s, when the gates burst open and the courts began to enforce a robust understanding of the Fifth Amendment as
a bar on federal subsidies for discrimination. Part IV probes how
the Supreme Court, D.C. Circuit, and other courts developed procedural doctrines effectively stymieing further litigation. Part V
considers why the Fifth Amendment no-aid principle went silent
and details the consequences. It suggests paths toward reopening
the constitutional debate and reviving the norm.
I. FEDERALLY FUNDED APARTHEID
In 1961, Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., issued a sharp
indictment: “We must face the tragic fact that the federal government is the nation’s highest investor in segregation,” he wrote in
The Nation.42 Officials were “Constitutionally obligated to use
[tax funds] for the benefit of all,” but instead systematically
funded local institutions practicing “open and notorious” racial
exclusion.43 King proposed “a rigorous program to wipe out immediately every vestige of federal support and sponsorship of discrimination.”44 This Part details the scope of federal support and
funding for racial discrimination, which stretched back nearly a
century, then turns to the constitutional arguments civil rights
lawyers crafted to challenge that longstanding pattern.
A. Social Welfare, Spending Clause Authority, and Jim Crow
Two years after King’s editorial, President John F. Kennedy
acknowledged the point: federal funds should not subsidize discrimination. “Simple justice requires that public funds, to which
all taxpayers of all races contribute, not be spent in any fashion
which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes or results in racial discrimination,” he explained to Congress as he called for forceful

42 Martin Luther King, Jr., Equality Now: The President Has the Power, THE NATION,
Feb. 4, 1961, at 91–92.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 92.
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new civil rights legislation.45 That purportedly “simple” principle
was not yet reflected in federal statutes or regulations.
The underlying problem was severe and well understood by
1963. Presidents, legislators, and federal administrators had publicly debated for decades the various ways in which the federal
authority and funding that gave rise to myriad, well-intentioned
social and regulatory programs—the sweep of the New Deal state
itself—also supported racial discrimination and segregation.46
From the late 1930s onward, to resolve a New Deal constitutional dilemma over federal power to create such programs, the
Supreme Court had blessed a framework in which Congress
would create, regulate, and fund such programs using its Spending Clause powers, without federal officials themselves running
schools, housing, job training, farm, or other programs.47 A federal
welfare state could be created, so long as federal officials stood in
the background and framed state and local participation as voluntary acceptance of federal funds.48 That overcame the basic objection that the Constitution entrusted all such areas of social life
to states, not the federal government.49
However, the work-around gave rise to a different constitutional problem. Did the federal government, in creating such
Spending Clause programs, incur constitutional obligations to
oversee how federally funded schools, housing, job programs, or
farm supports operated? In particular, did the Constitution have
anything to say about federal taxpayer dollars underwriting Jim
Crow?
Black leaders and their allies consistently argued that the
Constitution barred federal authorities from supporting racial
subordination, even as they also consistently supported extending
national social programs to assist the vulnerable.50 In effect, they

45 JOHN F. KENNEDY, SPECIAL MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS ON CIVIL RIGHTS & JOB
OPPORTUNITIES (1963), reprinted in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES: JOHN F. KENNEDY 483, 492 (1964).
46 See Plessy Preserved, supra note 25, at 951–1003; Subsidizing Segregation, supra
note 25, at 876–913; Linda R. Singer, Janet R. Altman, John W. Blouch, Robert A.W. Boraks,
Richard O. Cunningham, Gordan W. Hatheway, Jr., Carol P. Kelley, Robert Lewis & Daniel
C. Schwartz, Comment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—Implementation and Impact,
36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824, 827–28 (1968).
47 See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585–93 (1937); Helvering v. Davis,
301 U.S. 619, 641–45 (1937).
48 See Oklahoma v. U.S. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 142–44 (1947); United
States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51–54 (1938).
49 See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
50 See generally HAMILTON & HAMILTON, supra note 14 (describing civil rights organizations’ simultaneous pursuit of a “civil rights agenda” and a “social welfare agenda”).
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called for the burgeoning New Deal state to comply with the
Reconstruction Amendments.
But national policymakers did not want the constitutional
issue resolved—nor did the courts, through at least the first twothirds of the twentieth century. Doing so might have scuttled national policy goals for decades. Key parts of the legislative coalition
supporting such programs (most notably, southern Democrats)
vehemently opposed attempts to mandate equal treatment.51
Whether the Constitution required federal agencies to ensure
nondiscrimination was thus a politically inconvenient—if constitutionally glaring—question. Instead, federal officials authorized
(and federal dollars fueled) segregated and unequal school, housing, job, and farm programs, among other institutions.52
In 1961, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights directed
a lengthy memo to President Kennedy describing the results.53
The memo outlined “the massive involvement of the federal government in programs and activities that make it a silent, but none
the less full partner in the perpetuation of discriminatory practices.”54 In the prior year, for example, the nation had invested
more than $1 billion in the eleven former Confederate states (all
of which overtly practiced segregation), with states like Alabama
and Mississippi receiving more than 20% of their budget from federal funds.55
The Leadership Conference memo painstakingly detailed
vast federal investment in systemic race discrimination by states,
localities, and private actors in military affairs, education, employment, housing, health services, and agriculture.56 The military provided a glaring example, as integrating the armed forces
had been a core federal civil rights effort since the Truman administration.57 Yet well over a decade later sixteen states and the
District of Columbia practiced racial discrimination in their federally funded National Guards.58 In some southern states, the Reserve Officers Training Corps, the key pipeline for commissioned
officers in the federal military, excluded all Black students from

51

See supra note 26.
See supra notes 10, 25–26.
53 Memorandum from Roy Wilkins, supra note 10.
54 Id. at 2.
55 Id. at 8–9.
56 Memorandum from Roy Wilkins, supra note 10.
57 See Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4,311, 4,313 (July 28, 1948) (ordering an
end to racial discrimination in the armed forces).
58 Memorandum from Roy Wilkins, supra note 10, at 18.
52
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participation because of its administration through the segregated land grant colleges.59
Southern states received significant funding under the “impact aid” program for educating the children of federal employees,
including military members’ children, yet the schools receiving
those federal funds remained overwhelmingly segregated.60 Many
millions were paid annually for segregated vocational education
and libraries in southern states as well.61 The federally supported
land grant colleges remained segregated in six southern states,
and National Science Foundation grants flowed to segregated institutions as well.62
In the program of public employment services helping job
seekers (a program that was 100% federally funded while being
state administered), offices, waiting rooms, and job lists remained
separated by race in the South.63 Federal highway funds fueled
up to 90% of road building without imposing any nondiscrimination requirements for the jobs carrying out those projects.64
Local public housing authorities were required by federal
contract to achieve “racial equity” in providing housing for lowincome tenants but permitted to maintain de jure segregation in
that housing, leaving 80% of all such housing segregated nationwide—in a densely regulated program predominantly resting on
federal subsidies.65 The Federal Housing Administration’s (FHA)
mortgage guarantees fueled private housing construction in great
quantities (up to 25% of all private housing constructed in prior
years), contributing to the massive expansion of the suburbs. The
FHA once pushed developers to adopt racially restrictive covenants
and enforce segregation; now it continued to willingly back private
housing that was openly whites only.66 Veterans Administration
guarantees and loans also flowed without regard to the recipient’s
racial practices, no matter how racially exclusionary.67 Cities used
urban renewal funds to displace Black residents and tear down

59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Id. at 19.
Id. at 28–29.
Id. at 31–32.
Id. at 34–35.
Memorandum from Roy Wilkins, supra note 10, at 40–41.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 48.
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integrated neighborhoods in favor of segregated ones.68 Federal
subsidies even backed segregated college dorms.69
Public health funds for diverse goals from controlling water
pollution to heart disease flowed to states, without regard to their
racial practices. The Hill-Burton Act70 funded more than a billion
dollars in hospital construction, while requiring only that states
ensure “equitable provision” for all should they choose to segregate the facilities they built.71
Within the far-reaching network of farm supports operated
by the Agriculture Department via state and local partners, segregation reigned, and nonwhite farmers were left with little. In
the Farmers Home Administration, all-white committees of local
farmers determined who would be eligible for loans, with predictable results.72 The Extension Service operated on a segregated basis, with separate branches serving white and Black farmers—
though, in many places, no Black agents were available to serve
Black farmers at all.73 Even the federally backed Four-H clubs for
rural youth were separated.74
The Leadership Conference urged immediate executive action
to halt federal support for all such discriminatory programs. The
principle that the federal government “should in no way be a party
to discrimination” had been argued by the Justice Department over
a decade earlier in Shelley v. Kraemer75 and its federal companion
case.76 Subsequent presidents and the Supreme Court had affirmed this principle.77 It was time to fully implement the Fifth
Amendment’s equal protection requirements. Because Congress
refused to act and procedural barriers had stymied resolution in
the courts, the civil rights coalition called on the President himself

68

Memorandum from Roy Wilkins, supra note 10, at 49–50.
Id. at 48.
70 Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946).
71 Memorandum from Roy Wilkins, supra note 10, at 52–53.
72 Id. at 59.
73 Id. at 60–61; see also Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 390–91 (1986) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part) (describing the formal segregation of North Carolina Extension Service until 1965).
74 Memorandum from Roy Wilkins, supra note 10, at 61.
75 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
76 Memorandum from Roy Wilkins, supra note 10, at 11–12; see also Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae at 1–2, 52, 59–60 & n.31, Shelley, 334 U.S. 1 (No. 72).
77 Memorandum from Roy Wilkins, supra note 10, at 11–12 (first citing James Reston,
President Rejects Inquiry on Clergy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1953, at 11; then quoting Exec.
Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1975, 1977 (Mar. 8, 1961); and then citing Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954)) (referencing statements made by Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and
Kennedy and the Supreme Court’s decision in Bolling).
69
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to order the executive branch to comply with the Constitution.78
The Leadership Conference proposed that President Kennedy direct federal administrators to ensure “non-discrimination in all
programs, services and facilities . . . which receive the benefit of
any subsidy, loan, guarantee, or other form of federal assistance.”79
B. Opposing Federal Aid for Jim Crow
Civil rights advocates had honed the underlying legal claim
for decades: federal authority and funding should not support
racial discrimination. To make their argument, they gathered
support from preexisting threads of political rhetoric and constitutional doctrine. Eventually, the claim came to be framed as a
Fifth Amendment principle.
To undergird that constitutional claim, the NAACP worked
tenaciously to establish a series of interconnected principles: The
federal government was barred from discriminating on the grounds
of race, just as states and localities were, even though the Fifth
Amendment’s text did not contain an equal protection guarantee
as the Fourteenth Amendment’s did.80 That nondiscrimination
mandate itself barred not just unequal treatment in a material
sense but stigmatizing racial subordination in the form of segregation. Government actors could not contribute indirectly to such
forms of discrimination, either.
Though the national government, unlike the states, was not
subject to a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection mandate,
courts and other legal actors gradually came to agree that the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause imposed at least some
nondiscrimination constraints on federal actors. In the Japanese
American internment cases of the 1940s, the Court assumed
without deciding that the Fifth Amendment barred invidious race
discrimination, and, by the time of Brown v. Board of Education,81
it was finally willing to so hold.82 By 1954, the Supreme Court
endorsed two of the NAACP’s key claims in Brown and its federal
companion case, Bolling v. Sharpe:83 (1) that equal protection
barred government-imposed segregation and (2) that federal

78

Id. at 11–13.
Id. at 4.
80 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V, with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
81 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
82 See Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499–500; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
83 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
79
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actors were subject to similar equal protection constraints under
the Fifth Amendment.84
Nondiscrimination law also increasingly came to bar governments from accomplishing indirectly what they were barred from
seeking directly. In some instances, the logic was that private actors, by performing governmental functions or otherwise becoming intertwined with government, could become “state actors”
subject to constitutional mandates.85 Seeking to use the Constitution to restrain private actors was a key strategy for civil rights
advocacy in an era when few effective civil rights statutes governed the private sphere, hence the push to expand the parameters of “state action.”86
Related but distinct arguments underlay challenges to the
government actions supporting others’ discrimination. For example, in Shelley, also labeled a “state action” case,87 the Court ruled
that courts could not use their power to enforce racially restrictive
private agreements, indirectly ensuring widespread racial segregation that government could not mandate directly.88 That principle readily transferred to prohibit indirect federal involvement
in others’ discrimination—no matter whether the actor in question was a state, locality, or private entity. The key was that the
federal government should not, even from the background, support discrimination.
Given that so much federal activity occurred through delegating
authority and funding to others, the no-indirect-discrimination
principle came to be expressed as a bar on using federal resources
to support racially exclusionary programs. Seeds of such a principle could be found in nineteenth-century decisions barring the use
of public tax dollars on a segregated or racially exclusive basis.89
Moreover, NAACP leaders had long pressed the federal government to require nondiscrimination in the programs or activities it

84

Id. at 499–500; Brown, 347 U.S. at 493–95.
See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966) (noting that the conduct of a
private entity, if sufficiently entwined with state action, may be subject to the Fourteenth
Amendment). But see Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 10–11 (1883) (ruling that the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee applies only to government actors).
86 See Will Maslow & Joseph B. Robison, Civil Rights Legislation and the Fight for
Equality, 1862–1952, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 365, 373–75, 404–08 (1953).
87 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 524
(1985) (discussing Shelley in the context of state action cases more generally).
88 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20–21.
89 See, e.g., Puitt v. Comm’rs of Gaston Cnty., 94 N.C. 709, 714 (1886); Claybrook v.
City of Owensboro, 16 F. 297, 302 (D. Ky. 1883).
85
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supported,90 as when they fought to include a nondiscrimination
mandate in federal agricultural programs91 or excoriated early
1930s Mississippi River flood control projects as “a system of peonage organized by the federal government and paid for with
American tax dollars.”92
Over time, those attacks on the use of federal tax resources
for Jim Crow increasingly came in constitutional form. The
NAACP lawyers’ constitutional theories emerged in early memos
that they distributed to federal administrators challenging federal aid for segregated housing, whether it was low-income public
housing or privately built suburban subdivisions. In 1938, they
argued that public funds were being misused to support racial
discrimination and squarely challenged the legality of such action
under the Constitution.93 Twenty years earlier, in Buchanan v.
Warley,94 the Court had held that the Fourteenth Amendment
barred government actors from enacting residential segregation
ordinances.95 Several years later, the NAACP relied on Buchanan
in another memorandum to the President: If it was illegal for government actors to impose segregation directly, then “using Government power to crystallize current residential segregation

90 ROY WILKINS & TOM MATHEWS, STANDING FAST: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ROY
WILKINS 213 (1982) (describing how the NAACP used the recommendations laid out in the
Kerner Commission report—including nondiscrimination requirements for federal funding—as a “blueprint” in a decades-long political campaign).
91 See, e.g., Morton Sosna, The South in the Saddle: Racial Politics During the Wilson
Years, 54 WIS. MAG. HIST. 30, 42–45 (1970) (discussing the congressional debate surrounding the Smith-Lever Act and the proposal of amendments to ensure nondiscriminatory
funding).
92 Richard M. Mizelle, Jr., Black Levee Camp Workers, the NAACP, and the Mississippi Flood Control Project, 1927–1933, 98 J. AFR. AMER. HIST. 511, 513 (2013) (describing
the NAACP’s pressure on flood control projects).
93 Roy Wilkins wrote to the FHA head in October 1939: “We do not believe that the
federal government . . . should use the public tax money to restrict instead of extend opportunities for home ownership and to enforce patterns of racial segregation.” Letter from
Roy Wilkins, Assistant Sec’y, NAACP, to Stewart McDonald, Dir., Fed. Hous. Admin.
(Oct. 12, 1938) (on file at II:L17, Records of the NAACP, Manuscript Div., Libr. of Cong.,
Washington, D.C.); see also Letter from Walter White, Exec. Sec’y, NAACP, to Stewart
McDonald, Dir., Fed. Hous. Admin. (Dec. 23, 1938) (on file at II:L17, Records of the
NAACP, Manuscript Div., Libr. of Cong., Washington, D.C.); Memorandum from the
NAACP to President Franklin D. Roosevelt (Jan. 14, 1939) (on file at II:L17, Records of
the NAACP, Manuscript Div., Libr. of Cong., Washington, D.C.).
94 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
95 Id. at 60, 82.
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patterns” must be unconstitutional as well, they reasoned.96
“[T]he funds and power of all the citizenry” were at stake.97
It would take decades to convince courts of these principles.
But the basic logic made headway in other spheres. By the 1940s,
leading liberals began to understand federal funds as a key mechanism for securing constitutional mandates.98 In 1946, President
Harry Truman established the President’s Committee on Civil
Rights, charging it to report on how existing laws and authority
might be strengthened to protect civil rights.99 In its landmark
1947 report, the Committee recommended that all federal financial assistance be conditioned on the absence of racial segregation
and discrimination.100 The Committee’s sweeping recommendation impressed even civil rights leaders—prominent organizations like the NAACP had not yet gone that far in their demands.101 Southerners reacted angrily, grasping the stakes.102
Civil rights leaders also understood the power of a no-aid
mandate. By the early 1950s, anticipating ultimate victory in
Brown, an NAACP internal document posited that the no-aid
principle was a constitutional one that had to be implemented
across the full range of federal action.103 The authors proposed
that a memo be written to the president, which would be a “monumental work” that would “include, in addition to housing, . . . all
other federal programs and projects.”104 The core argument would
be that “the Supreme Court’s decisions in the school cases . . . opens
up a new era on the problem of racial segregation in America,” one
in which “the new administration is duty bound to implement

96 Memorandum Prepared by the Nat. Assoc. for the Advancement of Colored People,
Concerning the Present Discriminatory Policies of the Federal House Administration 3–4,
7, 9 (Oct. 28, 1944) (on file at II:A268, Records of the NAACP, Manuscript Div., Libr. of
Cong., Washington, D.C.).
97 Id. at 10.
98 See, e.g., Interview with Dr. Will Alexander, President’s Committee on Civil Rights
(May 15, 1947).
99 Exec. Order No. 9808, 11 Fed. Reg. 14,153, 14,153 (Dec. 7, 1946).
100 TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RIGHTS 166 (1947).
101 See HAMILTON & HAMILTON, supra note 14, at 99.
102 See, e.g., 94 CONG. REC. 1,448–49 (1948) (reproducing Sen. Harry Byrd’s speech of
Feb. 19, 1948); 94 CONG. REC. app. at 2,337–38 (1948) (reproducing Mississippi Sen. James
Eastland’s Apr. 15, 1947 speech attacking President Truman’s civil rights program).
103 Compare Memorandum at 10 (undated, c. 1953) (on file at II:A312, Records of the
NAACP, Manuscript Div., Libr. of Cong., Washington, D.C.), with MAR. 1953 CONF. COMM.,
NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND INC., RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING 57–58 (1953)
(on file at II:B76, Records of the NAACP, Manuscript Div., Libr. of Cong., Washington, D.C.).
104 See Memorandum, supra note 103, at 10.
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these decisions in every area touched by federal governmental
action.”105
The NAACP and its allies made those Fifth Amendment arguments explicitly to all three branches.106 In the ensuing years,
though, federal lawyers within the executive branch considered
and rejected the NAACP’s constitutional arguments that they
should halt federal aid to discriminatory institutions.
Federal agencies explicitly refused to condition federal funding on nondiscrimination at the very moment when Brown upended constitutional law by deeming “separate but equal” segregation unlawful.107 In 1954, lawyers within the government
immediately rejected the idea that Brown required their agencies
to halt funding for state or local segregated institutions. For example, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)
lawyers examined Brown’s impact on their funding of segregated
schools, hospitals, and other institutions. The lawyers acknowledged “the probable legal responsibility of the Department to
avoid the use of Federal monies for an unconstitutional purpose
which it can do by construing the [acts in question] consistent
with the Federal Constitution.”108 Yet they advocated that the
agency maintain the status quo, noting that the Supreme Court
had indicated its intent to postpone implementing Brown.109 In
the HEW Secretary’s words, the Department determined that it
would “follow the course we have always taken”—i.e., to fund segregation without objection.110
The Public Housing Administration (PHA) took an even
harder line. Its legal staff concluded that, despite Brown, “[l]ocal
housing authorities may continue to follow the laws and decisions
of their own states [mandating segregation].”111 Further, even if
the agency’s organic statutes were silent or ambiguous, the
105

Id.
See note 25.
107 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
108 Memorandum from A.D. Smith, Assistant Gen. Couns., Welfare & Educ. Div., to
Parke Banta, Gen. Couns. at 6 (June 9, 1954) (on file with National Archives and Records
Administration, College Park, Md., RG 235, Box 3, Off. of the Gen. Couns. Div. and Reg’l
Legal Precedent Op. Files, 1944–1974 [hereinafter OGC Opinion Files]).
109 Memorandum from A.D. Smith, supra note 108, at 7.
110 Memorandum from Parke Banta, Gen. Couns., Dep’t of Health, Educ., & Welfare,
to Oveta Culp Hobby, Sec’y, Dep’t of Health, Educ., & Welfare, 2 (June 22, 1954) (on file
with National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Md., RG 235, Box 3,
OGC Op. Files) (quoting minutes of the June 7, 1954, staff meeting).
111 Memorandum from Joseph Burstein, Legal Div., Pub. Hous. Admin., to John L.
McIntire, Gen. Couns. Pub. Hous. Admin. 1 (June 2, 1954) (on file with National Archives
and Records Administration, College Park, Md., RG 196, Box 9, Gen. Legal Op. Files,
1936–70).
106
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lawyers thought Congress’s refusal to adopt anti-segregation
amendments in prior housing legislation meant the agency was
bound by legislative will to continue backing segregation. They
drew upon the housing statutes’ principle of “local autonomy” as
further support for their position.112
Federal agencies thus explicitly decided to continue approving and subsidizing segregated institutions in the 1950s. They
persisted in this approach through the 1960s and beyond. As the
next Part shows, the courts initially took a similar stance. Yet
within two decades, the federal judiciary changed course and
sharply rejected the executive branch’s actions, eventually fully
embracing the NAACP’s Fifth Amendment reading. In the same
period, Congress codified the nascent constitutional principle in
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, charging all federal agencies with ensuring nondiscrimination in the programs they
funded.
II. CONSTRUCTING A CONSTITUTIONAL NO-AID PRINCIPLE
From the 1940s through the 1960s, civil rights lawyers protested federal approval and financial support for racial discrimination across multiple spheres. While they argued on many
grounds, they consistently called on the Fifth Amendment as the
fundamental mandate barring such federal aid for Jim Crow.
Advocates’ initial progress in establishing a no-aid mandate
was uneven, with only intermittent, partial victories in the courts
and halting policy changes by the executive branch. It was Congress—previously the most immovable of the branches—that took
the clearest initial step to embrace the norm, enacting a sweeping
rule against federal aid for racially discriminatory institutions in
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Subsequently, the Fifth Amendment
principle drew strength from developments in Fourteenth
Amendment case law. As the federal courts increasingly cracked
down on southern attempts to skirt the Brown mandate, they developed an equal protection jurisprudence that barred even indirect aid to segregation and that required government actors to
fully undo the consequences of prior intentional segregation. All
those developments laid the foundation for a robust Fifth Amendment norm by the early 1970s. This Part details those legal
changes.

112

Id. at 8.
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A. Early Litigation
For early litigants, the ongoing challenge was to state why
federal authority and funds could not be used to support others’
discrimination—and why this implicated the Constitution.113 The
most difficult question for courts was whether federal action authorizing or supporting discrimination was unlawful if federal officials did not directly carry out the discrimination themselves.
Those questions loomed large in fields where federal financing of
state, local, or private actors played a significant role, as with housing, hospitals, employment assistance, schools, and other areas.
Similar questions arose in fields where federal regulation was
pervasive and endowed private actors with federal authority or
approval, such as labor law and interstate transportation.
Such challenges provoked two separate inquiries, sometimes
collapsed under the single “state action” label. First, was the link
to federal actors robust enough that the other parties could be
viewed as essentially acting on federal officials’ behalf? That was
the critical question if the discriminatory actors were private entities and the litigants sought to directly halt their discrimination, because the Constitution would not come into play unless
they were deemed state actors.
However, if litigants only sought to halt government support
for the other parties’ discrimination, state action was clearly at
issue. The real question then was whether the act of providing
federal approval or aid itself violated the Constitution. The implicit assumption was that some forms of federal involvement
might be so minimal, arm’s-length, or widely distributed as to
evade scrutiny.
In the initial decades, courts did not always carefully distinguish between the two questions, terming both state action problems. But they did haltingly begin to indicate, along a variety of
fronts, that the Fifth Amendment limited the federal government’s support for discrimination by others.
1. Federal authority.
Several early challenges took place not in the context of
Spending Clause programs but rather in contexts where federal
law seemingly authorized private entities’ discrimination, such
as in labor law and interstate transit. Unions and railroads both
practiced overt racial segregation and exclusion through the
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See, e.g., MAR. 1953 CONF. COMM., supra note 103, at 3–4.
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mid-twentieth century, even while being extensively empowered
and regulated by federal authorities.114
The arguments took the same basic form as in the Spending
Clause context—that the Fifth Amendment prevented federal actors from lending support to discrimination. In the labor and transit
contexts, those constitutional arguments did not prevail, instead
reemerging as equivalent statutory constraints. The Supreme
Court read federal labor law and the Interstate Commerce Act115
to include equal protection–like restrictions on unions’ and railways’ discrimination.
In the labor context, courts sometimes asked whether unions
themselves became state actors insofar as they were “clothed with
[ ] governmental power” by federal labor law (given that it allowed
unions to bind even nonconsenting workers to the terms they negotiated in labor contracts).116 But there was also a distinct question at stake: whether Congress itself could constitutionally enact
a statute delegating such power while implicitly authorizing racial discrimination in its use. Congress’s act condoning discrimination—the statute—might violate the Fifth Amendment, even
if the unions’ discrimination remained beyond the reach of the
Constitution.
The NAACP and ACLU made the latter arguments to the
Court in the 1940s, arguing that the Fifth Amendment constrained any delegation of federal power.117 If federal labor law
were not interpreted to contain such prohibitions, then the statute would be unconstitutional as written because it would illegitimately sanction discrimination.
For example, in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad
Co.,118 a whites-only union had overtly discriminated against
Black employees in its position as exclusive bargaining representative under the Railway Labor Act.119 The NAACP argued (as
amicus) that if the federal statute were read to permit a whitesonly union to act as exclusive bargaining representative, the Act
would be unconstitutional—“a denial of due process and equal

114 See generally Herbert Hill, Racial Inequality in Employment: The Patterns of Discrimination, 357 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 30 (1965); Barbara Y. Welke, Beyond
Plessy: Space, Status, and Race in the Era of Jim Crow, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 267 (2000).
115 Pub. L. No. 49-104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
116 See Jerre S. Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEX. L. REV. 347, 355 (1963).
117 For an extensive examination of the constitutional arguments in the labor context,
see generally LEE, supra note 6.
118 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
119 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–165; Steele, 323 U.S. at 193–97. The union had attempted to push
all Black railroad firemen out of their positions in favor of whites. Id.
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protection to vest such powers over a Negro minority in a hostile
white majority.”120 Even if that were not accepted, “[t]he statutory
grant of the powers of majority rule to a labor organization must
be subject to the limitations of the Fifth Amendment.”121 A whitesonly union could not openly discriminate in its representation of
Black employees, or else the Act’s delegation of authority would
be unconstitutional.122
Instead of addressing the underlying constitutional arguments, the Steele Court interpreted the Railway Labor Act to require nondiscrimination in representation from a union acting as
exclusive bargaining agent for white and Black workers. Insofar
as the union “is clothed with power not unlike that of a legislature,” the Court read the Act to impose “at least as exacting a duty
to protect equally the interests of the members of the craft as the
Constitution imposes upon a legislature to give equal protection
to the interests of those for whom it legislates”—a rule that
barred “discriminations based on race alone [as] obviously irrelevant and invidious.”123 Justice Frank Murphy, concurring, argued
that any other interpretation would render the statute invalid under the Fifth Amendment.124
In the 1940s, advocates also used the federal government’s
constitutional obligations as a basis for challenging segregation
of interstate railroad passengers. To do so, they made express
Fifth Amendment arguments regarding the federally regulated
field of interstate transit, relying on expansive understandings of
both state action and federal constitutional responsibility. In 1950,
both the NAACP and the Department of Justice (DOJ) argued to
the Supreme Court in Henderson v. United States125 that the Fifth
Amendment governed—and made unlawful—the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC)’s actions in approving railroads’
120 Motion & Brief for the National Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People as
Amicus Curiae at 10, Tunstall v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210
(1944) (No. 37).
121 Id. at 11.
122 Id.; see also Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae & Brief in Support
Thereof at 15–17, Tunstall, 323 U.S. 210 (No. 37).
123 Steele, 323 U.S. at 198, 202–03.
124 Id. at 208 (Murphy, J., concurring). The lawfulness of labor union segregation,
under the Constitution or the statutory framework, remained unresolved. See Oliphant v.
Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 262 F.2d 359, 361–63 (6th Cir. 1958) (ruling
that there was insufficient federal action to find a Fifth Amendment violation and that
the union was rather “a private association, whose membership policies are its own”). See
generally Betts v. Easley, 169 P.2d 831 (Kan. 1946) (ruling union’s segregation unconstitutional); Nat’l Fed’n of Ry. Workers v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 110 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1940)
(declining to invalidate union’s segregation).
125 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
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segregation policies.126 DOJ lawyers wrote that “basic constitutional
doctrine [ ] condemns racial discriminations having the sanction of
law or the support of an agency of government.”127 The railroad’s
regulations requiring segregation, “which carry the endorsement of
an agency of government,” constituted “legally-enforced racial segregation” in violation of the Constitution as well as the statute.128
As in the labor context, the Court sidestepped the constitutional questions and ruled on statutory duties instead. The Court
had previously interpreted the Interstate Commerce Act’s129
prohibition of “undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage”
to parallel the Constitution’s bars on discrimination.130 Now, in
Henderson, the Court ruled that the failure to provide an open
dining car seat to a Black passenger on request violated the Act’s
mandate of “equality of treatment.”131 Again, the Court read the
equality guarantee into the statute itself.
2. Federal financial backing.
The argument that federal taxpayers’ funds should not support racial discrimination emerged even earlier. NAACP leaders
honed their Fifth Amendment arguments in the housing context,
where the Depression’s damage to the housing industry had led
the federal government to enact a wide-reaching web of supports,
administered by agencies like the FHA and the PHA.
However, such claims did not fare well in initial litigation. In
particular, early state and federal decisions refused both to restrict private real estate developers from discrimination (even if
they received substantial public backing) and to bar government
actors from supporting discriminatory home builders.

126 The Justice Department filed separately from the ICC, explaining that “the United
States is of the view [ ] that the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission is invalid.”
Brief for the United States at 1, Henderson, 339 U.S. 816 (No. 25). Henderson had filed an
administrative complaint with the ICC, which denied relief, finding the railroad’s segregation regulations valid under the Act. Id. at 3–9.
127 Id. at 14. The Fifth Amendment specifically prohibited “[r]acial discriminations
effected by action of the Federal Government, or any agency thereof.” Id. at 15. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People similarly argued that “[i]t is [ ]
now clear . . . that the government cannot be a party to the enforcement of racial distinctions and classifications which are privately promulgated.” Motion & Brief for the NAACP
as Amicus Curiae at 22 & n.29, Henderson, 339 U.S. 816 (No. 25).
128 Brief for the United States, supra note 126, at 23–24.
129 Pub. L. No. 49-104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 301–354).
130 Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80, 94–95 (1941) (quoting Interstate Commerce
Act § 3, 24 Stat. at 380) (ruling that the Interstate Commerce Act imposed a Plessy-like
duty of “equality of treatment” for segregated railroad passengers).
131 Henderson, 339 U.S. at 825.
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In a key early challenge, Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp.,132
New York’s highest court refused to apply constitutional constraints to a discriminatory private developer, despite its receipt
of multiple forms of significant state aid. The court held that the
new development of Stuyvesant Town in New York City (housing
25,000 tenants across many city blocks) could exclude African
Americans, despite the city’s use of eminent domain and closure
of existing streets to assemble the parcel on the developers’ behalf, along with its grant of a 25-year tax exemption.133
The Dorsey majority acknowledged that the city officials
providing all these benefits could not have similarly excluded
Black tenants, had they acted directly.134 But to the majority, a
ruling that government subsidies entailed similar legal restraints
on private developers would come “perilously close to asserting
that any State assistance to an organization which discriminates
necessarily violates the Fourteenth Amendment.”135 Decades
later, as it struggled to halt overt resistance to Brown, the U.S.
Supreme Court would endorse that proposition—but it was too
radical in 1949.136
Six years later, a federal district court similarly rejected the
related argument for halting government supports to such discriminatory developers, even if the developers themselves could
not be restrained by the Constitution. In Johnson v. Levitt &
Sons,137 the court reasoned that the FHA’s financial guarantees
and regulatory conditions for private developers did not obligate
the FHA to bar discrimination by those same developers.138 Indirect government involvement—even crucial financial support for
known discrimination—did not trigger constitutional duties, in
that court’s view.
However, the very next year, the Fifth Circuit took a different
stance. In Heyward v. Public Housing Administration,139 the court
deemed viable the argument that federal financial support and involvement placed constitutional duties on federal administrators.140
Relying on the plaintiffs’ contention that federal and local officials
had “jointly planned, constructed, operated, and maintained”
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140

87 N.E.2d 541 (N.Y. 1949).
Dorsey, 87 N.E.2d at 547–48, 550–51.
Id. at 550.
Id. at 551.
See infra Part IV.C.
131 F. Supp 114 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
Id. at 116.
238 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1956).
Id. at 689.

2022]

The Constitution and Federally Funded Apartheid

93

segregated public housing in Savannah, the court reversed summary judgment for the federal defendants on the Fifth Amendment
claims against them.141 Perhaps the fact that government-owned
housing was at issue (hence subject to Fourteenth Amendment
constraints on its operation) made the judges more receptive to
extending the constitutional mandate to federal actors as well. Or
perhaps they viewed public housing’s receipt of substantial, direct
federal subsidies as more significant than the indirect subsidy of
FHA mortgage insurance.
At least one court had no doubt that FHA mortgage guarantees constituted sufficient federal involvement to subject the
builders benefiting from them to constitutional scrutiny. In 1958
a California state appellate court ruled that private builders’ reliance upon federal mortgage insurance subjected them to constitutional prohibitions.142 Citing the FHA’s creation of an intricate
system aimed at “making [ ] adequate housing more readily available,” and the federal government’s own responsibility to not
“play favorites as to race, color, or creed,” the court in Ming v.
Horgan143 found real estate developers and brokers of FHAbacked subdivision to be bound by equal protection requirements.144 The court vividly explained the plaintiff’s theory of liability: “[W]hen one dips one’s hand into the Federal Treasury, a
little democracy necessarily clings to whatever is withdrawn.”145
Litigated challenges to federal backing for discrimination
thus bore mixed results through the 1950s. But by the early
1960s, even executive branch lawyers themselves began to rely
on federal funding as a basis to challenge segregation. Prior to the
1964 Civil Rights Act, the Justice Department lacked express
statutory authority to challenge systemic violations of constitutional rights, so federal attorneys needed other bases for suit.146
Federal funding—which created a contractual relationship between the recipient and the federal government—offered a potential basis.
In fall 1962, with the Kennedy administration under significant pressure to take long-promised action on civil rights issues,
the DOJ began challenging segregation in schools supported by
141

Id. at 692, 696–97.
Ming v. Horgan, 3 Race Rel. L. Rep. 693 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1958).
143 3 Race Rel. L. Rep. 693 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1958).
144 Id. at 695, 698–99.
145 Id. at 697.
146 See William L. Taylor, Actions in Equity by the U.S. to Enforce School Desegregation, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 539, 541–42 (1961) (describing failed attempts in 1957 and
1960 to enact statutory authority).
142
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federal impact aid.147 Such schools enrolled significant numbers
of federal military members’ or other federal employees’ children;
the federal subsidies were justified on the ground that federal installations did not pay local property taxes, depriving the district
of part of its tax base, even as federal children filled local
schools.148
DOJ lawyers did not go so far as to argue that federal officials
themselves, by providing federal funding to segregated schools,
were violating the Fifth Amendment. However, the DOJ relied
upon the Fifth Amendment in its statutory construction, arguing
that the federal impact aid statute would violate the Constitution
if it purported to authorize segregation.149 The DOJ’s impact aid
litigation brought only limited success, with several district
courts dismissing the suits on procedural grounds, and a single
court upholding the statutory and contractual arguments.150
A clear victory for the Fifth Amendment principle finally came
in a suit the DOJ joined in a different context—private litigants’
challenge to segregation in nonprofit hospitals constructed and
supported with federal and state funds under the Hill-Burton
Act.151 Hill-Burton, enacted in 1946, merely required states to
assure “equitable provision” for any groups excluded from local
healthcare facilities based on “race, creed, or color.”152 In effect,
Hill-Burton codified a “separate but equal” approach. After NAACP
lawyers brought suit in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital,153 the United States intervened, agreeing with the
plaintiffs that the Hill-Burton Act’s explicit approval of “racial
discrimination by state-connected institutions” violated the Fifth
Amendment.154 “What the Constitution forbids, Congress may not
sanction,” the DOJ lawyers wrote.155

147

Anthony Lewis, U.S. Suit Attacks School Race Bars, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1962, at 1.
See U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., CIVIL RIGHTS 198–99 (1963).
149 Plaintiff’s Pre-trial Memorandum of Law at 27–28, United States v. Cnty. Sch.
Bd., 221 F. Supp. 93 (E.D. Va. 1963) (No. 3536).
150 Cnty. Sch. Bd., 221 F. Supp. at 99–101; United States v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd., 220
F. Supp. 243, 247 (W.D. La. 1963), aff’d 336 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v.
Madison Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 219 F. Supp. 60, 61 (N.D. Ala. 1963), aff’d 326 F.2d 237 (5th
Cir. 1964); United States v. Biloxi Mun. Sch. Dist., 219 F. Supp. 691, 694–95 (S.D. Miss.
1963), aff’d 326 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1964).
151 Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946).
152 Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 965 (4th Cir. 1963) (citing
Hospital Survey and Construction Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 291e(f))).
153 211 F. Supp. 628 (M.D.N.C. 1962).
154 Memorandum of the United States at 14, Simkins, 211 F. Supp. 628 (No. C-57-G-62).
155 Id. at 21.
148
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In 1963, the Fourth Circuit upheld that view. The court ruled
that two North Carolina hospitals’ exclusion of Black doctors and
patients represented “state action” unlawful under the Fourteenth Amendment, relying on the hospitals’ role in “comprehensive joint or intermeshing state and federal . . . programs designed . . . for the best possible promotion and maintenance of
public health.”156 Separately, the court went on to specifically rule
the “separate-but-equal” clause in the federal statute (and its implementing regulations) invalid on Fifth Amendment grounds,
describing it as “an affirmative sanction of the unconstitutional
practice” of racial segregation.157
Simkins was the first decision expressly striking down federal support for segregation on constitutional grounds. But the
Fourth Circuit did not provide a framework for determining when
federal action in support of discrimination would run afoul of the
Fifth Amendment. Apparently, nearly a decade after Brown, a federal statute explicitly authorizing segregation so clearly violated
the Fifth Amendment that further elaboration was unnecessary.158
B. Statutory Adoption
As the courts considered the Fifth Amendment’s reach, advocates also sought to embed the principle in legislation.
For decades, liberals had attempted to enact provisions barring discrimination in particular federal programs. By the 1950s,
those proposals came to be known as “Powell Amendments,”
named for their usual sponsor in the House, Representative
Adam Clayton Powell.159 Advocates and legislators clearly articulated the constitutional principle behind such amendments—that
federal actors could not lawfully provide support to Jim Crow institutions.160 Such nondiscrimination amendments invariably went
down in defeat, with nay votes coming from northern Democrats
who deemed themselves civil rights supporters, but who believed
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Simkins, 323 F.2d at 967–69.
Id. at 969.
158 Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969) (“Congress is without power to
enlist state cooperation in a joint federal-state program by legislation which authorizes
the States to violate the Equal Protection Clause.”).
159 See Singer et al., supra note 46, at 826; HAMILTON & HAMILTON, supra note 14, at 102.
160 See, e.g., Letter from Frances Levenson, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Comm. Against Disc. in
Hous., to Sen. Prescott Bush (July 23, 1956) (on file at II:A162, Records of the NAACP,
Manuscript Div., Libr. of Cong., Washington, D.C.); see also Federally Assisted Public Education Programs, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & Lab., 87th Cong. 431 (1962)
(statement of Sen. Kenneth Keating). See generally 107 CONG. REC. 8,530 (1961); 109
CONG. REC. 12,090 (1963).
157
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that adding the provisions would sacrifice southern legislators’
support—and thereby defeat the underlying social programs.161
Finally, in 1963, President Kennedy included in his proposed civil
rights legislation a provision that would authorize (but not require)
federal agencies to halt funding for discriminatory programs.162
When legislators considered the provision that would become
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, its constitutional roots
were clear to all. Some supporters pointed to—but did not fully
endorse—the argument that the Constitution required the federal government to halt its financial support for segregation. For
example, when Representative Emanuel Celler told the House in
January 1964 that Congress had the constitutional authority to
use Title VI to condition federal funding on nondiscrimination, he
noted: “[A] strong argument can be made that the Constitution
requires that programs and activities receiving significant financial assistance from the United States refrain from racial segregation or discrimination.”163 Others were more emphatic, emphasizing that the statute “would do no more than recognize the
requirements of the Constitution which impose a mandate of
equality on all governmental action.”164
Title VI, as ultimately enacted, was framed as a direct bar on
race and national origin discrimination within any program receiving federal assistance.165 Additional provisions required federal agencies to enforce the principle through rulemaking and voluntary negotiation in cases of noncompliance—and, if that failed,
by moving to terminate federal funding or “any other means authorized by law.”166
Congress intentionally crafted Title VI to be mandatory.
Legislators rejected a weaker version proposed by the Kennedy
administration, which clarified that executive officials could
choose to cut off funding in response to discrimination but left to
their discretion whether to take action.167
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HAMILTON & HAMILTON, supra note 14, at 101–07.
See H.R. 7152, 88th Cong. (1st Sess. 1963).
163 110 CONG. REC. 1527 (1964) (statement of Rep. Celler).
164 Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 1367
(1963) (statement of Will Maslow, Exec. Dir., Am. Jewish Cong.).
165 Title VI barred race and national origin discrimination in “any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance” and directed federal agencies to achieve compliance by
terminating funding or “any other means authorized by law.” Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.
L. No. 88-352, §§ 601, 602, 78 Stat. 241, 252–53 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, 2000d-1).
166 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 602, 78 Stat. at 253.
167 See Singer et al., supra note 46, at 831–35.
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The statute thus embodied the Fifth Amendment no-aid principle that NAACP leaders and other civil rights activists had advocated for decades. Title VI would be replicated in two famous
successor statutes: Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972168
(barring sex discrimination in federally assisted education programs) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973169 (barring
disability discrimination in both federal and federally assisted
programs). Similar but lesser known discrimination bans were,
and continue to be, inserted in many specific statutes.170 Collectively, these “Spending Clause civil rights statutes”171 implement
the constitutional bar on federal involvement in discrimination
across the landscape of federally funded programs.
Another landmark civil rights statute of the 1960s—not
premised on Spending Clause authority—also figured in subsequent attempts to enforce the no-aid principle. The Fair Housing
Act of 1968 barred discrimination in housing and created an explicit, distinctive duty for federal officials, an obligation “affirmatively to further the policies” of the Act—i.e., to pursue fair housing itself.172 The Act’s “affirmatively further” mandate173 created
an obligation for federal actors to actively combat existing segregation, rather than simply refrain from future discrimination.174
Both Title VI and the Fair Housing Act would become key
tools for litigants attempting to stop continued federal backing for
segregationist projects across the country. By the late 1960s, lower
federal courts would begin to adopt these statutory arguments to
find federal officials liable, often in the most emphatic terms.
C. A Clear No-Aid Principle
For constitutional claims, though, the clearest legal framework
for addressing indirect government participation in discrimination
168 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373 (codified at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1681–1688).
169 Rehabilitation Act, § 504, Pub L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 794).
170 See, e.g., Guardians Ass’n v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 620 n.9 (1983)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (listing eight additional nondiscrimination provisions in other
statutes that were modeled upon Title VI).
171 I use this term as a shorthand for this overall complex of statutes prohibiting discrimination in programs based on Spending Clause authority.
172 Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 804–806, 808, 82 Stat. 73, 83–85.
173 Fair Housing Act, § 808(e)(5), 82 Stat. at 85.
174 See N.A.A.C.P. v. Sec’y of HUD, 817 F.2d 149, 155 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that the
provision was intended to ensure that “HUD use its grant programs to assist in ending
discrimination and segregation, to the point where the supply of genuinely open housing
increases”).
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emerged in a different context altogether—that of state and local
action, rather than federal activity.
Post-Brown, the federal courts had confronted the flagrant
defiance of those determined to preserve Jim Crow in the South.
Eventually, federal judges began pushing back strongly against
state and local attempts to skirt constitutional mandates. By the
early 1970s they had created a doctrine that disallowed any financial support for segregation by government, regardless of motive—the strongest version of the no-aid principle. No apparent
reason prevented those decisions from applying to federal action
as well, given the courts’ congruent application of the equal protection mandate to state and federal actors in that era.
The starting point for these cases involving defiance to Brown
came in Cooper v. Aaron,175 when the Supreme Court ruled against
Little Rock’s attempt to postpone school desegregation.176 After
Arkansas state officials moved to block desegregation in Little
Rock using the state’s national guard in fall 1957, white violence
ensued, controlled only by federal troops.177 The following fall, the
Supreme Court denounced the state’s defiance in strong terms:
the students’ equal protection rights “can neither be nullified
openly and directly by state [officials] . . . nor nullified indirectly
by them through evasive schemes for segregation.”178 Under
Brown, the Court wrote, “[s]tate support of segregated schools
through any arrangement, management, funds, or property cannot
be squared with” the Equal Protection Clause.179
While the Court’s primary focus in Cooper was the Arkansas
governor’s defiance of the federal courts, the decision’s broad language swept in the various measures the Arkansas legislature
had taken to avoid desegregation, which included laws authorizing school closures in case of desegregation and government tuition vouchers for affected white students to attend private whitesonly schools.180
In subsequent years, many southern states and localities followed Arkansas’s example, attempting to replace segregated
white schools with a parallel “private” system of whites-only
schools that actually rested on public funds (often referred to as
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358 U.S. 1 (1958).
Id. at 17.
177 Id. at 7–13.
178 Id. at 17.
179 Id. at 19.
180 See Sondra Gordy, Empty Classrooms, Empty Hearts: Little Rock Secondary
Teachers, 1958–1959, 56 ARK. HIST. Q. 427, 429 (1997).
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“segregation academies”).181 In response, the lower federal courts
struck down tuition grants and related subsidies for such
schools—decisions readily affirmed by the Supreme Court in per
curiam rulings.182 In 1969, a federal district court distilled those
tuition voucher decisions into the sweeping principle that any “arrangement [that] in any measure, no matter how slight, contributes to or permits continuance of segregated public school education” was invalid.183
In the tuition voucher cases, the lower federal courts clarified
that whether the private schools’ discrimination amounted to
state action was not the key issue, but rather the legality of governmental aid itself. Litigants were not attempting to regulate
the actions of the school themselves, but simply to halt the flow
of aid. Judges reasoned that “[t]he payment of public funds in any
amount through a state commission under authority of a state law
is undeniably state action.”184 In suits challenging the governmental
aid on its own terms (and not attempting to restrain the private
entity), they concluded that there was no need to consider whether
the private actor itself could be regulated as a state actor.185
Instead, the real issue was whether governmental aid, even
if it seemed benign in motivation or insignificant in its impact,
violated constitutional requirements. At first, lower courts emphasized “the State’s affirmative, purposeful policy of fostering

181 For example, in 1967, a three-judge panel wrote that “it is now becoming apparent
that the State of Alabama is attempting to make a concerted effort to establish and support
a separate and private school system for white students.” Lee v. Macon Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
267 F. Supp. 458, 477 (M.D. Ala. 1967), aff’d sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S.
215 (1967) (per curiam).
182 See generally Coffey v. State Educ. Fin. Comm’n, 296 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss.
1969); Brown v. S.C. State Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 199 (D.S.C. 1968), aff’d, 393 U.S. 222
(1968) (per curiam); Poindexter v. La. Fin. Assistance Comm’n, 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La.
1967), aff’d, 389 U.S. 571 (1968) (per curiam); Lee, 267 F. Supp. 458.
183 Griffin v. State Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (E.D. Va. 1969) (emphasis in
original).
184 Poindexter, 275 F. Supp. at 854.
185 Cf. Lee, 267 F. Supp. at 478 (threatening that, if the court were forced to continue
striking down state attempts to support segregated whites-only private schools, the court
would have to extend its ruling, deem the private schools themselves state actors, and
include them in the court’s statewide desegregation order).
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segregated schools.”186 But later decisions focused only on the aid
itself, regardless of motive.187
By 1973, the Supreme Court was willing to sign off on this
principle, though it had already begun to articulate limits to the
state action doctrine itself.188 The Court endorsed the no-aid rule
in a case arising in Mississippi, where defiance of Brown was arguably most pronounced.189
In Mississippi, during the seven years after the first school
desegregation orders, the number of students in nonreligious private schools had grown nearly twentyfold.190 In Tunica County,
after a district court ordered desegregation of the public schools,
every white student in the county withdrew. They entered a newly
formed private academy, and the local high school’s principal and
eighteen white teachers followed them, resigning at midyear. The
school board voted to pay those teachers their full salary for the
year nonetheless, even as they taught in the whites-only school.
The white children’s state-owned textbooks went with them to the
new school.191
In Norwood v. Harrison,192 parents of Black children attending public schools in Tunica County challenged Mississippi’s provision of free textbooks to students enrolled in private segregation
academies, on the ground that it “impeded the establishment of
racially integrated public schools in violation of plaintiffs’ [Fourteenth Amendment] rights.”193

186 Poindexter, 275 F. Supp. at 854 (looking for “significant state involvement in private discrimination” as the threshold for a constitutional violation); see also Lee v. Macon
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 231 F. Supp. 743, 754 (M.D. Ala. 1964) (ruling that state tuition grants
“would be unconstitutional where they are designed to further or have the effect of furthering [ ] segregation in the public schools”).
187 Griffin, 296 F. Supp. at 1181 (stating that “any assist whatever by the State towards
provision of a racially segregated education, exceeds the pale of tolerance demarked by the
Constitution. . . . [N]either motive nor purpose is an indispensable element of the breach.”
(emphasis in original)).
188 Cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175–77 (1972) (ruling that a discriminatory private club was not rendered a state actor by virtue of its licensing by the
state’s Liquor Control Board).
189 See, e.g., 7 U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., THE MISSISSIPPI DELTA REPORT 44 (2001) (describing a state official’s account that “no state fought harder than Mississippi after Brown
to thwart integration”).
190 Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 457 (1973).
191 Appellants’ Brief at 3–4, Norwood, 413 U.S. 455 (No. 72-77).
192 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
193 Appellants’ Brief, supra note 191, at 6; see also Norwood v. Harrison, 340 F. Supp.
1003, 1005 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (describing the complaint). The books went to “34,000 students . . . attending 107 all-white, nonsectarian private schools . . . formed throughout the
state since the inception of public school desegregation.” Id. at 1011.
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A three-judge district court initially rejected the challenge,
noting that the First Amendment did not bar provision of textbooks to religious schools, and reasoning that the equal protection
mandate should not reach further than the Establishment
Clause.194 Further, the underlying facially neutral state textbook
program was not originally created to evade integration mandates; it had existed since 1940, providing books to all children in
the state, at both public and private schools.195 The court therefore
upheld the “benevolent and racially neutral” program, noting that
it was unclear whether withdrawing the aid would have any impact on students’ enrollment decisions.196
Reversing, the Supreme Court wrote, “it is [ ] axiomatic that
a state may not induce, encourage or promote private persons to
accomplish what it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish.” 197
Textbooks could not be distinguished from tuition grants or loans,
as “the economic consequence is to give aid to the enterprise.”198
The Norwood Court also rejected the premise that discriminatory
intent had to be shown: “The Equal Protection Clause would be a
sterile promise if state involvement in possible private activity
could be shielded altogether from constitutional scrutiny simply
because its ultimate end was not discrimination but some higher
goal.”199
Nor was ambiguity regarding the textbooks’ causal impact a
significant obstacle. The Court indicated that it was unnecessary
for the plaintiffs to prove that the loaned textbooks played any
particular causal role in driving white students to withdraw from
public schools (and thus in causing the plaintiffs’ ultimate injury
by reinforcing racial segregation).200 The difficulty of offering a
clear causal link—proving that government aid played a specific
role in generating plaintiffs’ injuries from segregation itself—
would prove to be a stumbling block for plaintiffs’ ability to establish standing in later cases. But, in this earlier era, the Norwood
Court indicated that the threshold for showing a constitutional
violation was simply that the government aid had a “significant

194

Norwood, 340 F. Supp. at 1011.
Id. at 1007, 1013.
196 Id. at 1013.
197 Norwood, 413 U.S. at 465 (quoting Lee, 267 F. Supp. at 475–76).
198 Id. at 464. Unlike “electricity, water, and police and fire protection,” textbooks
were provided only to schools and could be obtained from other sources. Id. at 465.
199 Id. at 466–67.
200 Id. at 465–66 (“[T]he Constitution does not permit the State to aid discrimination
even when there is no precise causal relationship between state financial aid to a private
school and the continued well-being of that school.”).
195
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tendency to facilitate” discrimination, a test facially met for most
subsidies.201
Thus, Norwood articulated a clear constitutional bar on government support for discrimination, even if well-intentioned or
ambiguous in its causal impact. In focusing on Mississippi and
other southern states’ flagrant attempts to subvert the judiciary’s
mandates, the Court may not have dwelled upon the implications
of its ruling for federal actors supporting discrimination in other
settings. By 1975, the Court was stating in other contexts that
the Fifth Amendment’s nondiscrimination mandate was identical
to that imposed on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause.202 Norwood, then, fully governed federal
officials.
D. Remedying All Vestiges of State-Sponsored Segregation
In the same period, the federal judiciary announced a robust,
ongoing constitutional duty for government actors to affirmatively
undo segregation that they had constructed. Along with attempts
to recreate segregation in private whites-only schools, state and
local officials also defied Brown’s mandate by enacting formally
race-neutral public school assignment policies that preserved
prior segregated systems.203 “Freedom of choice” plans maintained
existing school assignments, but authorized students to “choose”
to attend schools with children of other races. In practice, officials
discouraged or denied such transfers and Black families faced
economic reprisal and violence for attempting to enroll their children in white schools.204 Unsurprisingly, freedom of choice policies
produced very little desegregation.
The Supreme Court eventually signaled that such paper compliance with Brown was insufficient.205 Districts had to actively
reconstruct the segregated institutions they had created.
Immediately after Brown, the Court had called for “transition
to a racially nondiscriminatory school system” yet simultaneously
201

Id. at 466.
See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (“This Court’s approach
to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to
equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
203 See Singer et al., supra note 46, at 897–98.
204 See id. at 899–900.
205 In so doing, the Court affirmed the approach taken by HEW’s Office for Civil
Rights and the Fifth Circuit, the appellate court presiding over most of the South, which
eventually rejected paper compliance and called for actual desegregation. See STEPHEN C.
HALPERN, ON THE LIMITS OF THE LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY OF TITLE VI OF THE 1964 CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT 42–80 (1995).
202
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endorsed gradualism by calling for the shift to occur with “all deliberate speed.”206 Progress was halting until the late 1960s, when
the executive branch began using the newly enacted Title VI as a
means to prod school districts to start desegregation by threatening to terminate federal funds if the districts did not begin complying with Brown.207
At that point, the federal courts also began shaping more demanding constitutional remedies.208 In 1968, in Green v. County
School Board,209 the Supreme Court resoundingly affirmed that
approach, writing that Brown II was “a call for the dismantling of
well-entrenched dual systems” of segregated schools.210 School
officials had the “affirmative duty to take whatever steps might
be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.”211 Courts were
to “retain jurisdiction until it is clear that state-imposed segregation has been completely removed.”212 Several years later, in
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,213 the Court
confirmed that “[t]he objective [ ] remains to eliminate from the
public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation.”214
In 1979, the Court emphasized that the remedial mandate of
Green and Swann did not dissipate with time; failure to repair
one’s past discrimination constituted an ongoing constitutional
violation. Any school district engaging in past intentional segregation had a “continuing ‘affirmative duty to disestablish the dual
school system.’” 215 Moreover, the test for whether schools had met
206

Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
HALPERN, supra note 205, at 42–80.
208 See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 845–47, 861–
69 (5th Cir. 1966) (“The United States Constitution, as construed in Brown, requires public school systems to integrate students, faculties, facilities, and activities.”).
209 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
210 Id. at 437.
211 Id. at 437–38.
212 Id. at 439.
213 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
214 Id. at 15; see also id. at 18–31 (endorsing aggressive, race-based measures to
achieve that goal).
215 Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 460 (1979) (quoting McDaniel v.
Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971)); see also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton II), 443
U.S. 526, 537 (1979) (ruling that any school district engaging in past intentional segregation faced “a continuing duty to eradicate the effects of that [segregated] system”). Though
later decisions by a more conservative Court weakened the standard for deeming a district
successful in remedying desegregation, calling for the “vestiges of past discrimination [to
be] eliminated to the extent practicable,” the basic mandate did not change. Bd. of Educ.
v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991); see also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 485 (1992)
(allowing for incremental withdrawal of supervision as compliance with desegregation orders increased); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 50 (1990) (limiting courts’ equitable
207
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that duty was “the effectiveness, not the purpose, of the[ir] actions
in decreasing or increasing the segregation caused by the dual
system.”216
Like Norwood’s bar on governmental support for segregation,
the Green/Swann mandate to eliminate “all vestiges” of segregation transferred intact to federal officials under the Fifth Amendment. If federal officials had participated in entrenching racial
segregation, then they had the ongoing, affirmative duty to dismantle the dual systems they had created; benign intent would
not shield them from liability. Thus, by the 1970s, clear equal protection principles required federal officials to avoid knowingly
aiding discrimination, and to repair discriminatory systems that
federal actors had helped construct.
III. THE ENFORCEABLE FIFTH AMENDMENT
Over the next dozen years, civil rights lawyers found that
they could enforce the Fifth Amendment in new and sweeping
ways using those principles. Arguments that the federal government could not constitutionally participate in discrimination—even
indirectly through its Spending Clause authority—moved from the
realm of optimistic rhetoric to enforceable, black-letter law.
The lower courts consolidated a simple syllogism, citing just
three Supreme Court decisions for a clear no-aid principle. It ran
as follows: The Fifth Amendment bars discrimination by federal
officials, just as the Fourteenth Amendment does for state officials.217 Further, the Constitution bars “not just [ ] direct involvement, but also [ ] government ‘support’ of discrimination ‘through
any arrangement, management, funds or property.’” 218 Finally,
knowing government support of discrimination is invalid, even if
motivated by “benign” ends.219 Hence federal aid to discriminatory
institutions violated the Fifth Amendment, regardless of motive.
Relying on those principles, courts in the late 1960s and 1970s
repeatedly found the federal government to be inextricably and unconstitutionally intertwined with other actors’ discrimination.

discretion in ordering remedies); Goodwin Liu, Brown, Bollinger, and Beyond, 47 HOW.
L.J. 705, 728–30 (2004) (assessing Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins); Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The High Cost of Education Federalism, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 287, 300–03
(2013) (same).
216 Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 538.
217 Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499–500.
218 Nat’l Black Police Ass’n, Inc. v. Velde, 712 F.2d 569, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting
Cooper, 358 U.S. at 19).
219 Norwood, 413 U.S. at 467.
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They also referenced the government’s duty to undo the harms of
the segregation it had helped construct.
But even as the no-aid principle appeared fully realized,
doubts surfaced. The syllogism had been constructed to respond
to the historically specific circumstances of southern defiance and
was buttressed by apparent congressional approval in the form of
parallel statutory mandates.
As lawyers tried to push the no-aid principle to its logical limits, its substance came into tension with other areas of constitutional jurisprudence. First, in the context of government financial
support for religious institutions (such as schools), the Court had
allowed some forms of subsidy to occur, despite the strictures of
the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. Establishment
Clause principles also permitted some “neutral” forms of aid to
flow, such as tax exemptions. Why should the Constitution constrain government subsidies or support differently for one purpose versus another?
Second, to the extent that purposeful discrimination was required to violate the Equal Protection Clause—an interpretation
that did not emerge as black-letter law until the late 1970s—then
how could government financial aid to segregated programs or institutions be unlawful, if federal actors themselves acted to further benign goals (such as improving schools, expanding
healthcare, or offering decent housing for the poor)? As litigation
emerged challenging federal tax exemptions for racially discriminatory institutions that operated as nonprofits in the private
sphere, those questions grew acute.
This Part first details the consolidation of the no-aid principle
in lower court cases involving housing, employment, and schools,
then it shows how the tax subsidy cases pressed the doctrine toward
its logical limits—just as the executive branch and courts began
moving decisively to the right.
A. Newly Powerful Federal Constraints
After 1964, litigants pressed their Fifth Amendment claims
alongside claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act or similar
statutes, thus signaling Congress’s implied blessing. Sometimes
the statutory claims themselves stood in place of constitutional
ones, acting as near-perfect equivalents. In this new wave of opinions, courts did not carefully distinguish among the various ways
in which federal agencies supported others’ discrimination, such
as by the extent of federal funding, the level of federal involvement, or the degree of explicit federal encouragement or approval
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for discrimination. If courts had focused on such distinctions, they
might have calibrated more refined tests for determining when
federal action went too far in aiding segregation or discrimination. Instead, federal judges articulated a near-absolute rule
against federal support for discrimination.
1. Housing.
At times, courts enforced the no-aid principle by relying
solely on the new civil rights statutes and without resolving Fifth
Amendment claims. Beginning in 1969, federal courts in Louisiana,
Philadelphia, and Texas had no trouble finding illegality by HUD
when it authorized local officials to construct and operate public
housing in ways intended “to perpetuate segregation of the races.”220
In Hicks v. Weaver,221 the district court emphasized that federal officials not only authorized federal funding for segregated
housing projects in Bogalusa, Louisiana, but also “directed every
detail of the development and construction of the proposed units,
even down to . . . the location of the plumbing fixtures in the kitchens.”222 HUD thus was an “active participant” in the discrimination.223 Yet the court ultimately rested on Title VI alone, without
addressing the Fifth Amendment claim.224 The Third Circuit
ruled similarly in Shannon v. HUD,225 finding that HUD had
failed to consider the effect on racial segregation in approving
more low-income housing in a Philadelphia urban renewal district, thereby violating Title VI and the Fair Housing Act.226 A year
later, a district court in Texas concluded that “HUD was a knowing
and willing partner with the [Austin] Housing Authority in pursuing a policy of racial segregation from 1938 through October
1967.”227 The court followed Hicks and Shannon in enjoining the
use of a currently selected site for new public housing on Title VI
and Fair Housing Act grounds rather than constitutional ones.228
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit did not avoid the constitutional claim in considering HUD’s liability for the segregation of

220

Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619, 623 (E.D. La. 1969).
302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969).
222 Id. at 622.
223 Id. at 623.
224 Id.; cf. Primus, supra note 6, at 991 n.74 (concluding that “the opinion in its entirety can be read to find a constitutional violation”).
225 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
226 Id. at 817–21.
227 Blackshear Residents Org. v. Hous. Auth., 347 F. Supp. 1138, 1143 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
228 Id. at 1145–46.
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Chicago public housing in 1971. In Gautreaux v. Romney,229 the
court wrote that HUD’s Secretary “exercised the [agency’s] . . .
powers in a manner which perpetuated a racially discriminatory
housing system in Chicago, and [ ] the Secretary and other HUD
officials were aware of that fact.”230 Federal officials’ benign motives
could not stave off liability: the agency’s “approval and funding of
segregated [ ] housing sites cannot be excused as an attempted
accommodation of an admittedly urgent need for housing with the
reality of community and City Council resistance.”231 Knowing
support for racial segregation, no matter how benign the federal
officials’ ultimate motive, violated both the Fifth Amendment and
Title VI.232
Several years later, the Sixth Circuit relied on Hicks, Shannon, and Gautreaux in upholding federal liability for an urban
renewal project in Hamtramck, Michigan, in which city officials
intended to achieve “planned population loss of Black citizens”—
by razing their homes without providing any possibility of replacement housing within the city.233 HUD had violated both the
Fifth Amendment’s and Title VI’s bans on race discrimination:
“By failing to halt a city program where discrimination in housing
was being practiced and encouraged, HUD perpetuated segregation . . . and participated in denial to the plaintiffs of their constitutional rights.”234 Moreover, HUD was responsible for remedying
the ongoing effects of those violations, through “an affirmative
program to eliminate discrimination” from the city’s Wyandotte
Project.235 The court cited the Court’s school desegregation jurisprudence in discussing HUD’s obligation to affirmatively undo
the segregation it had helped to create.236
In the early 1980s, the Eighth Circuit considered the federal
government’s involvement in the long-term segregation of public
housing in Texarkana, Arkansas.237 After recounting years of
HUD decisions to continue providing funding in the face of known
intentional discrimination by the local housing authorities, the
panel concluded that federal officials’ actions themselves also

229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237

448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 739.
Id. at 737.
Id. at 740.
Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 503 F.2d 1236, 1242, 1247 (6th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 1247.
Id.
Id. (citing Swann, 402 U.S. at 16).
Clients’ Council v. Pierce, 711 F.2d 1406 (8th Cir. 1983).
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reflected intentional race discrimination.238 They may have
deemed that conclusion necessary to their ruling, given that the
Court had ruled in Washington v. Davis239 that equal protection
violations required a showing of discriminatory intent.240
Rejecting the argument that HUD simply acted simply out of
benign desire to provide housing for the poor, the court wrote that
“the agency did not have to approve, support, and lobby in favor
of [the Texarkana Housing Authority]’s discrimination.”241 The
court concluded that HUD was at least partially motivated by “a
discriminatory purpose” as it was “inconceivable that HUD would
have so frequently acted to approve the Texarkana Housing
Authority’s actions for so long unless its officials held the view
that segregation and discrimination were acceptable.”242 HUD’s
Fifth Amendment liability was so clear that the court deemed it
unnecessary to even consider the parallel Title VI claim.243
2. Employment.
Courts began to read the Fifth Amendment to give federal
officials authority to stamp out discrimination throughout federally funded programs, including vis-à-vis such programs’ employees. Thus, in a 1968 DOJ suit against Alabama state agencies to
enforce a federal statutory requirement that federally financed
programs operate under a merit system of employment (and
therefore halt race discrimination), Judge Frank Johnson of the
Middle District of Alabama found that the Constitution itself militated in favor of the Attorney General’s authority to bring suit.244
“[T]he interest of the United States in these Federally financed
programs may be so considerable that the Government, through
its duly constituted officials, including the Attorney General of
the United States, has a constitutional obligation to eliminate racial discrimination in their administration.”245
The federal government also had the constitutional obligation
to avoid fueling employment discrimination through its efforts to
support job seekers. In NAACP v. Brennan,246 farmworkers had
challenged federal approval and full funding of state employment
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246

Id. at 1410–23.
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Id. at 238–41.
Clients’ Council, 711 F.2d at 1423.
Id. (“We do not suggest that HUD officials were motivated by malice.”).
Id. at 1424–25.
United States ex. rel. Clark v. Frazer, 297 F. Supp. 319, 323 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
Id. at 323.
360 F. Supp. 1006 (D.D.C. 1973).
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services offices engaging in discrimination.247 In 1972, the Department of Labor’s investigation had documented widespread discrimination in the state offices, yet the secretary had funded the
state services without protest for the subsequent year.248
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia elegantly
summarized the black-letter law underpinning the federal constitutional obligation: Fifth Amendment violations “may arise when
Federal officials provide financial assistance to, and exercise
some degree of control over, State agencies that discriminate.”249
Title VI “implements [those] fundamental Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment prohibitions on government support to institutions
which practice racial or national origin discrimination.”250 Both
the Constitution and Title VI imposed on federal officials “not
only the duty to refrain from participating in discriminatory practices, but the affirmative duty to police the operations of and prevent such discrimination by State or local agencies funded by
them.”251 By extending uninterrupted funding in the face of documented discrimination, the agency had “knowingly acquiesced in
and helped to perpetuate” the states’ discrimination, in violation
of its constitutional and statutory duties.252
The Eighth Circuit emphasized that same year that “any
recognition or enforcement of illegal racial policies by a federal
agency is proscribed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.”253 For the National Labor Relations Board to recognize a discriminatory union as an exclusive bargaining representative, was for it to “become[ ] a willing participant in the
union’s discriminatory practices.”254 Moreover, even if active discrimination had ceased, the union had to remedy the racial imbalances persisting in its membership; “the remedial machinery
of the National Labor Relations Act cannot be available to a union
which is unwilling to correct past practices of racial discrimination.”255 The constitutional duty to undo the harms of the past extended beyond government-imposed segregation and required

247 Id. at 1008; see also Donald Janson, Seasonal Farm Workers Suing Labor Department on Job Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1972, at 36.
248 Brennan, 360 F. Supp. at 1014–15.
249 Id. at 1011 (first citing Simkins, 323 F.2d at 963–70; then citing Gautreaux, 448
F.2d at 740; and then citing Hicks, 302 F. Supp. at 622–23).
250 Id. at 1012.
251 Id.
252 Id. at 1015.
253 NLRB v. Mansion House Ctr. Mgmt. Corp., 473 F.2d 471, 473 (8th Cir. 1973).
254 Id. at 473.
255 Id. at 477.
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federal officials to ensure that those wielding federally delegated
power remedied past discrimination.
By 1975, a district court could examine existing precedent
and conclude: “Where recipients of federal funds have engaged in
unlawful discrimination, courts have been quick to require that
federal agencies refrain from participating in the discriminatory
practices, and exercise affirmative duties to police compliance and
prevent constitutionally and statutorily proscribed discrimination.”256 Black Chicago police officers had challenged the provision
of federal revenue-sharing funds to finance the Chicago police department, which engaged in racially discriminatory employment
practices.257 Under the Fifth Amendment, “public funds or benefits may not be extended to governmental agencies which practice
racial discrimination.”258 The court therefore sustained an existing injunction against payment of federal revenue-sharing funds
to the City.259
Eight years later, a D.C. Circuit majority affirmed that the
no-aid principle was “a clearly established principle of constitutional law.”260 The Fifth Amendment requirement was simple:
“[T]he federal government may not fund local agencies known to
be unconstitutionally discriminating.”261 In National Black Police
Association v. Velde,262 twelve individuals and the National Black
Police Association sued the DOJ’s Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration for knowingly funding state and local police departments that engaged in intentional race and sex discrimination.263
The D.C. Circuit panel found that both the Crime Control Act of
1973264 and the Fifth Amendment created sufficiently clear no-aid
duties to overcome the individual defendants’ qualified immunity.265

256 United States v. City of Chicago, 395 F. Supp. 329, 342–43 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (discussing Brennan, Adams, and the Mississippi tax exemption rulings discussed in
Part III.B).
257 Id. at 332–33, 343.
258 Id. at 343 (first citing Norwood, 413 U.S. 455; then citing Gilmore, 417 U.S. 556;
then citing Bolling, 347 U.S. 497; and then citing Brennan, 360 F. Supp. at 1011).
259 Id. at 344–45.
260 Velde, 712 F.2d at 580.
261 Id.
262 712 F.2d 569 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
263 Id. at 572.
264 Pub. L. No. 93-83, 87 Stat. 197 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S. Code).
265 Velde, 712 F.2d at 576–83.
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3. Schools.
Courts also ruled that federal officials were obliged to ensure the desegregation of the schools they funded. The most farreaching of these cases, Adams v. Richardson,266 began simply
enough, though it would become extremely controversial. After
the Nixon administration forced HEW to drastically pare back its
enforcement of Title VI’s desegregation mandate in the schools
and universities it funded,267 civil rights organizations brought
suit to force the agency to return to actively policing racial segregation and discrimination.268 In Adams, the district court found
that the agency had shifted almost entirely to “voluntary compliance” rather than initiating fund termination or other enforcement actions against institutions that refused to desegregate.269
Judge John Pratt ordered HEW to begin enforcement proceedings
against the school districts and state higher education systems
that the agency had previously deemed out of compliance with
Title VI.270
When Adams first went before the en banc D.C. Circuit in
1973, the court ruled that Title VI enforcement was not a matter
of unreviewable agency discretion, thus allowing suit under the
APA.271 The APA provides a general cause of action to challenge
unlawful agency action, but it is unavailable if a statute precludes
review or “agency action is committed to agency discretion by
law.”272 HEW analogized to precedents indicating that prosecutors’ decisions not to bring enforcement actions were discretionary and thus insulated from review.273
The Adams majority rejected HEW’s reasoning: unlike instances of ordinary prosecutorial decision-making, the agency
was not simply declining to act but “actively supplying segregated
institutions with federal funds.”274 Such action implicated Fifth
266

480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Chinh Q. Le, Racially Integrated Education and the Role of the Federal Government, 88 N.C. L. REV. 725, 738–39 (2010) (discussing HEW’s policy of “benign neglect”
under President Nixon and the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund’s subsequent
suit challenging the policy).
268 Adams v. Richardson (Adams II), 356 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C. 1973).
269 Adams v. Richardson (Adams I), 351 F. Supp. 636, 640 (D.D.C. 1972).
270 Adams II, 356 F. Supp. at 96.
271 Adams v. Richardson (Adams III), 480 F.2d 1159, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc).
272 5 U.S.C. § 701(a).
273 Adams III, 480 F.2d at 1162 (first citing Georgia v. Mitchell, 450 F.2d 1317 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); then citing Peek v. Mitchell, 419 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1970); then citing Powell v.
Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965); and then citing Moses v. Katzenbach, 342 F.2d
931 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
274 Id.
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Amendment concerns: “It is one thing to say the Justice Department lacks the resources necessary to locate and prosecute every
civil rights violator; it is quite another to say HEW may affirmatively continue to channel federal funds to defaulting schools.”275
In a different case a year later, the D.C. Circuit overrode
HEW’s decision to fund school districts that had failed to fully
desegregate, relying on the Fifth Amendment principle that federal agencies operated under a “general obligation not to allow
federal funds to be supportive of illegal discrimination.”276 Given
those constitutional concerns, the panel interpreted the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972277 to bar waivers for noncomplying
districts.278 On the panel’s view, “the Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions virtually mandate adherence to a [statutory] construction which insists upon immediate removal of the effects of
educational discrimination based on race, particularly where federal funding is involved.”279
In one instance, HEW’s refusal to fund affirmative remedies
to undo prior de jure school segregation violated the Fifth Amendment. A Tennessee district court found that HEW, in 1971, had
adopted a policy—contrary to the relevant statutes—of refusing
all Emergency School Assistance funds for busing to carry out
school desegregation, due in part to President Nixon’s announced
opposition.280 HEW officials then refused Nashville school officials’ urgent requests for funds to acquire additional buses to
carry out court-ordered desegregation.281 The agency’s bar on such
funding, the court found, violated both procedural due process
and equal protection aspects of the Fifth Amendment and “obstruct[ed] the process of desegregation” mandated after Brown.282
B. Pushing the No-Aid Logic to Its Limit: Tax Subsidies
As advocates challenged federal support for discrimination in
all forms, taxes eventually came to the forefront. Previously, the
fact that all taxpayers paid into the federal fisc, regardless of race,
275

Id.
Kelsey v. Weinberger, 498 F.2d 701, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (quoting Adams III, 480
F.2d at 1166).
277 Pub. L. No. 92-318, §§ 701–720, 86 Stat. 354 (repealed 1978).
278 Kelsey, 498 F.2d at 711; see also id. at 708 (“Appellees’ reading of the Act’s waiver
provision as a license to fund school districts in which the evils of discriminatory teacher
assignments remain uneradicated generates concern of constitutional proportions.”).
279 Id. at 711.
280 Kelley v. Metro. Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F. Supp. 540, 553–54 (M.D. Tenn. 1973).
281 Id. at 546.
282 Id. at 559–60.
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underlay moral and legal claims that the government must distribute its funds fairly.283 Eventually, activists also turned their
attention to the ways in which the tax system itself distributed
resources—as subsidies to nonprofit organizations in the form of
tax exemptions and income tax deductions for contributions to
such organizations.
Taxes pushed the argument challenging federal subsidies for
discrimination closer to its limits. Did any type of support—no
matter its form or how widely offered—violate the Constitution?
Establishment Clause cases had already confronted this question,
in considering what sorts of government aid would constitute an
unlawful “establishment of religion.”284 In 1947, the Court indicated that government could supply “such general government
services as ordinary police and fire protection, connections for
sewage disposal, public highways and sidewalks” to religious
bodies without violating the bar on compelled taxation to support
religion.285 Tax exemptions for nonprofit organizations appeared
to be just a few steps beyond police and fire protection in the
spectrum of governmental support.286 The Court thus upheld local
property tax exemptions for churches in 1970.287
Legal actors’ drive to address thinly veiled defiance of Brown
led to different outcomes in the context of racial segregation. As
the civil rights conflicts of the 1960s escalated, activists’ attention
turned to the role of tax exemptions as public subsidies. Early on,
groups like the Congress of Racial Equality denounced investment houses’ participation in selling tax-exempt bonds to finance
southern states and localities practicing segregation.288
As segregation academies took root in the South, advocates
then turned to fighting tax exemptions for those private schools.289
283

See supra notes 89, 97, 142.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
285 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1947) (upholding reimbursement of
public bus fare for transportation to religious schools, under general statute authorizing
reimbursement of such transportation expenses for all school children).
286 Cf. Jackson v. Statler Found., 496 F.2d 623, 638 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“An exemption or other tax benefit, available
to a wide range of institutions, has always been regarded as the least possible form of
government support, except for the police and fire protection provided all citizens.”).
287 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 672–80 (1970).
288 See Childs Securities to Shun Alabama Bonds; Several Big Dealers Call Move IllConceived, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1965, at 4; Firm Picketed for Buying Segregated Schools’
Bonds, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 1963, at 25; H.J. Maidenberg, CORE Attacking Southern
Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1962, at 52.
289 See Note, The Judicial Role in Attacking Racial Discrimination in Tax-Exempt
Private Schools, 93 HARV. L. REV. 378, 378 (1979) (“Beginning shortly after Brown, segregationists attempted to reduce the budgets of public schools while simultaneously
284
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The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights’ (USCCR) July 1967 report
on southern school desegregation flagged the rapidly growing
flight to segregation academies as a serious obstacle to integration.
Hundreds of whites-only private schools had been established in
response to integration orders.290 For example, in Lowndes County,
Alabama, the public high school’s white enrollment fell from 178 to
3 in a single year, after the first Black students enrolled and a new
private school, Lowndes County Christian Academy, simultaneously opened in the facilities of a former public school, receiving $100,000 in tax-exempt donations.291
USCCR staff lawyers argued that the federal government
should interpret Title VI and the Internal Revenue Code to bar
tax exemptions for racially segregated private schools.292 They
also posited that “serious constitutional questions” were at stake
under the Fifth Amendment as to whether the federal government could constitutionally provide nonprofit tax subsidies to racially discriminatory schools.293
However, the IRS disagreed a month later. After initially
freezing tax exemptions for segregated schools in 1965, the IRS
announced, in August 1967, that it would continue allowing tax
exemptions for private, racially discriminatory schools, so long as
states’ involvement did not render the schools themselves state
actors.294
Advocates began challenging the IRS policy in the courts, and
in 1970, a suit brought by the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law, Green v. Kennedy,295 bore fruit.296 Green was a
class action filed by Black families of public schoolchildren in Mississippi. A three-judge panel of the D.C. district court preliminarily enjoined the IRS from issuing tax-exemption rulings for private segregation academies in Mississippi.297 The judges reasoned
developing programs of public tuition assistance and textbook loans to newly-founded private schools.”).
290 U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 1966–67, at 143 (1967)
(citing information obtained by other federal agencies).
291 Id. at 78, 145.
292 Id. at 143–52.
293 Id. at 153–56 (emphasis omitted).
294 See Jean F. Rydstrom, Allowability of Federal Tax Benefits to a Private, Racially
Segregated School or College, 7 A.L.R. Fed. 548 (1971) (describing IRS freeze and citing a
1967 IRS press release); see also Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (D.D.C 1970).
295 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C 1970).
296 See The Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, 24 WASH. STATE BAR
NEWS, May 1970, at 11–12 (describing the formation of the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law and the group’s legal efforts, including its move to challenge tax subsidies for segregated schools).
297 Green, 309 F. Supp. at 1131.
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that the plaintiffs had presented “Grave Constitutional Issues” as
to whether the Fifth Amendment barred federal support for such
schools, even if the support were indirect via tax exemption.298
Emphasizing that benign goals could not insulate the federal policies, the panel noted that the federal government was not simply
subsidizing private discrimination—but rather supporting an effort to recreate the former Jim Crow system in the private
sphere.299
After the first Green decision, in “a complete policy reversal,”
the IRS announced that it would no longer grant exemptions to
discriminatory private schools.300 A year later, the same threejudge panel granted a declaratory judgment and permanent
injunction to the plaintiffs in Green.301 The panel relied on the
Internal Revenue Code to bar tax exemptions for segregation
academies, noting that the Constitution strongly favored this result.302 The Supreme Court affirmed without opinion later that year.
Unsurprisingly, the law in action differed from that announced. The new IRS policy induced by Green was a paper tiger.
Soon after its announcement, advocates questioned its efficacy.303
The new policy required schools simply to certify their own nondiscrimination. Three southern schools approved in the very first
set of decisions under the new policy appeared to be segregation
academies.304

298 Id. at 1133; see also id. at 1134–36 (concluding that “the tax benefits . . . mean a
substantial and significant support by the Government to the segregated private school
pattern”).
299 Id. at 1137.
300 Linda Mathews, ‘Racist’ Schools to Lose Tax Break, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 1970, at 1.
301 Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971), aff’d sub nom. Coit v. Green,
404 U.S. 997 (1971).
302 Green, 330 F. Supp. at 1157, 1164; see also id. at 1164–65 (reasoning that “[c]learly
the Federal Government could not under the Constitution give direct financial aid to
schools practicing racial discrimination” and that indirect tax subsidies were nearly indistinguishable from such financial aid).
303 See Note, supra note 289, at 381 (“Skeptics maintained that the formal requirements resulted in a presumption that ‘a private school [is] nondiscriminatory just because
it says it is.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Proposed IRS Revenue Procedure Affecting
Tax-Exemption of Private Schools: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong. 479, 483 (1979) (statement of E. Richard Larson,
Nat’l Staff Couns., ACLU)).
304 Gayle Tunnell, Tax Exemption for 3 Schools Opposed, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1970,
at A6. The Carter administration later met serious backlash in Congress when it announced policies aimed at actually enforcing the policy, rather than simply accepting paper certifications. See Olatunde C. Johnson, The Story of Bob Jones University v. United
States: Race, Religion, and Congress’ Extraordinary Acquiescence, in STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION STORIES 133, 135–38 (William N. Eskridge, Jr., et al. eds., 2011).
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Meanwhile, litigators had already pressed the tax subsidy
question beyond schools. In 1972, a different three-judge panel in
the D.C. district court went beyond the Green rulings, extending
Green’s logic from schools to private social organizations.305 In
McGlotten v. Connally,306 a Black plaintiff rejected from membership by an Elks lodge in Portland, Oregon, sued the Treasury Department to challenge the tax-exempt status of the Elks organization, along with all other discriminatory fraternal orders and
clubs.307 The three-judge court held that the federal government’s
authorization of tax-exempt status and deductibility of contributions for discriminatory fraternal orders did “aid, perpetuate or
encourage” racial discrimination and involved the government to
such a degree as to violate the Fifth Amendment.308
Commentators worried over McGlotten’s sweeping implications. Yale tax law professor Boris Bittker and Kenneth Kaufman
critiqued all aspects of the court’s ruling, but especially its attempt
“to avoid the conclusion that everyone is subject to constitutional
obligations” due to the wide dispersion of tax benefits of varying
forms to the public.309 Avoiding universal application of the
Constitution led the court to rely upon “ambiguous and unsatisfactory distinctions” between different types of tax treatment and
subsidies, the authors argued.310 Their critique suggested that a
no-aid principle had no real stopping point once applied to the tax
system.
A decade later, the issue of tax exemptions for discriminatory
organizations reached the Supreme Court. The case centered on
the IRS’s denial of tax-exempt status to Bob Jones University, a
university with a long history of discrimination against Black students and interracial couples.311 When Bob Jones v. United
States312 came before the Court, it engendered upheaval in the

305

See generally McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
307 The Elks’ constitution restricted its membership to “white male citizen[s].” Id. at
450 n.1.
308 Id. at 455–57, 459. The court also concluded that the Internal Revenue Code and
Title VI barred the tax exemption for fraternal orders on grounds independent of its constitutional holding. Id. at 460, 462.
309 See Boris I. Bittker & Kenneth M. Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: “Constitutionalizing” the Internal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51, 68–69 (1972).
310 Id. at 68, 74.
311 See generally Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). A companion
case involved Goldsboro Christian Schools, another private school (serving K–12 students)
with a racially discriminatory admissions policy.
312 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
306

2022]

The Constitution and Federally Funded Apartheid

117

Reagan Administration.313 Conservative pressure led the administration to withdraw its prior support for the IRS interpretation,
and the DOJ subsequently filed a merits brief arguing against the
government’s prior policy.314 The Supreme Court instead appointed William Coleman, a prominent Washington lawyer and
chair of the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund’s board,
to argue that the IRS had been correct in interpreting the Code to
bar such exemptions.315
The Fifth Amendment backdrop for the case was clear. The
Fourth Circuit had upheld the IRS view of the statute, citing “the
clearly defined public policy, rooted in our Constitution, condemning
racial discrimination and, more specifically, the government policy
against subsidizing racial discrimination in education, public or
private.”316 But the DOJ’s lawyers now posited that equal protection norms simply did not apply. In Washington v. Davis, the Court
had ruled that disproportionate race-based harms could not establish an equal protection violation standing alone, absent evidence
that government officials acted with discriminatory intent.317
Now, the Justice Department argued that Davis shielded federal tax exemptions from equal protection scrutiny so long as the
federal officials adopting and implementing them did not intend
to discriminate.318 Norwood, they suggested, had been overtaken
by subsequent decisions if it indicated otherwise.319 Moreover, the
federal government’s involvement was not significant enough to
render the university’s discrimination a “joint venture[ ]” under
state action doctrine.320 They also posited that tax exemptions differed from affirmative subsidies, as simply a negative “decision
by Congress to refrain from collecting taxes”—mere inaction rather than active support.321
313

For a detailed recounting, see Johnson, supra note 304, at 147–48.
See Brief for the United States at 11–13, Bob Jones, 461 U.S. 574 (No. 81-1) (arguing that lower courts correctly upheld IRS position denying the tax exemptions).
315 See William T. Coleman, Jr., Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of the Judgments
Below, Bob Jones, 461 U.S. 574 (No. 81-1); Matt Schudel, William T. Coleman Jr., BarrierBreaking Civil Rights Lawyer, Cabinet Officer, Dies at 96, WASH. POST. (Mar. 31, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/william-t-coleman-jr-transportation-secretary-and
-civil-rights-lawyer-dies-at-96/2017/03/31/94c21ce6-1624-11e7-833c-503e1f6394c9_story.html.
316 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 1980), aff’d, 461 U.S.
574 (1983). In a footnote, the court emphasized Norwood’s constitutional holding: “The
Constitution commands that government not provide any form of tangible assistance to
schools which discriminate on the basis of race.” Id. at 152 n.7.
317 426 U.S. 229, 238–41 (1976).
318 Brief for the United States, supra note 314, at 39.
319 Id. at 39 n.36.
320 Id. at 40 (citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176–77).
321 Id. at 40.
314
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William Coleman and civil rights groups drew on the Fifth
Amendment to defend the IRS’s statutory interpretation.322 Citing
Norwood, Coleman wrote: “The Government has an affirmative
constitutional duty to steer clear of providing significant aid to
such schools.”323 He rejected the DOJ argument that Davis had
silently overruled the no-aid principle, given that the case had
addressed a situation in which no actor had engaged in intentional discrimination—unlike the present context, which involved
overt, intentional discrimination by the beneficiaries of federal
tax subsidies.324 The Lawyers’ Committee and the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund went further, arguing that the Court should explicitly adopt a constitutional principle barring tax subsidies for discriminatory schools. Norwood required that result: “[A]ny tangible state assistance . . . is constitutionally prohibited if it has a
‘significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce, and support private
discrimination.’” 325 Tax exemptions could not help but fall under
this principle.
The Fifth Amendment arguments alarmed certain observers,
even if they agreed with the “growing consensus that the Government should not subsidize discrimination.”326 Over four hundred
organizations, including some of America’s largest corporations and
nonprofit groups, filed an amicus brief as the “Independent Sector”
coalition.327 They argued for affirming on statutory grounds alone,
concerned that a Fifth Amendment ruling might “blur the distinction between private charitable activity and government action,”
and thereby “imperil the very independence of the independent
sector.”328 The specter of universal application of the Constitution
worried others too, including a prominent New York Times legal
affairs columnist who wrote that “all private tax-exempt groups

322 See Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of the Judgments Below, supra note 315, at
9, 57–62.
323 Id. at 9.
324 Id. at 58.
325 Brief of the National Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People, et al., Amici
Curiae, in Support of Affirmance at 27–28, Bob Jones, 461 U.S. 574 (No. 81-1) (quoting
Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 568–69 (1974)); see also Brief for the Lawyers’
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of the United States
at 10, Bob Jones, 461 U.S. 574 (No. 81-1).
326 Stuart Taylor, Jr., Bias and Tax Exemptions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1982, at 7.
327 Motion of Independent Sector for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae at 1, Bob
Jones, 461 U.S. 574 (No. 81-1).
328 Brief Amicus Curiae of Independent Sector in Support of Affirmance at 3, Bob
Jones, 461 U.S. 574 (No. 81-1); Motion of Independent Sector for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae, supra note 327, at 3.
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could come under the complex web of regulations and legal obligations that accompany direct Government subsidies.”329
The Bob Jones Court did not take up the constitutional invitation, perhaps convinced that applying a constitutional no-aid rule
to tax subsidies would go too far. Instead, the Court ruled that the
Internal Revenue Code was best interpreted to deny tax-exempt
status to racially discriminatory institutions. The Court thus read
the constitutional argument into the statutory framework, as it
had done decades earlier in cases like Steele and Henderson.
But the Bob Jones ruling—a statutory no-tax-aid principle—
would soon be undercut by procedural restrictions. As the Court
weighed in, another case was already proceeding through the
courts that highlighted the precarious nature of the tax-subsidy
challenges. Then captioned Wright v. Regan,330 the litigation
would eventually foreground the Court’s concerns with permitting litigants to challenge the government’s beneficence toward
others—even when that beneficence meant providing federal subsidies for Jim Crow institutions. The next Part turns to that decision and similar ones limiting the reach of the newly crystallized
Fifth Amendment no-aid mandate.
IV. THE EVANESCENT FIFTH AMENDMENT
The enforceable Fifth Amendment began to dissipate in the
1980s. Substantive principles did not markedly shift, despite the
tensions with “intent” doctrine and Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Federal courts were unwilling to explicitly jettison the
rule prohibiting the federal government from knowingly aiding
intentional, systemic discrimination.
Instead, newly tightened doctrines around standing, causes
of action, and related litigation hurdles undermined litigants’
ability to sue the federal government for supporting discrimination, whether under the Fifth Amendment or its statutory proxies. A procedural veil fell over the constitutional debates, stifling
them before deeper substantive questions could be addressed.
Several key Supreme Court rulings proved difficult to overcome: Cannon v. University of Chicago,331 Allen v. Wright,332 and
Heckler v. Chaney.333 The D.C. Circuit built upon the Court’s doctrine in those cases in ways that further limited the viability of
329
330
331
332
333

Taylor, supra note 326, at 1.
656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev’d sub nom. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
441 U.S. 677 (1979).
468 U.S. 737 (1984).
470 U.S. 821 (1985).
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suits enforcing the no-aid principle. Ironically, where once the
modern Spending Clause civil rights statutes lent force to the
Fifth Amendment arguments, now those statutes were read to insulate the federal government from direct liability for its own constitutional transgressions.
Litigants who chose to rely solely on Title VI or similar statutory claims to challenge federal support for discrimination contributed to the dynamic. Once the Fifth Amendment “illegal subsidies” claim was translated into statutory terms, it readily
morphed into an argument for the federal government to do a better job of enforcing its own civil right statutes, like Title VI,
against others (instead of one for the federal government to itself
comply with the Constitution). Such suits were easily recharacterized as generalized attempts to force the federal government
to pursue stronger civil rights enforcement, triggering courts’ reluctance to interfere with administrators’ decisions about how to
allocate limited enforcement resources.
A. The Supreme Court Constructs New Procedural Limits
During the 1970s, the Supreme Court began restricting access
to the courts using a variety of tools. Leading scholars have charted
how the Court’s tightening of procedural doctrines has curtailed
rights enforcement.334 While the Court’s decisions formed part of a
broader movement to tamp down litigation, several of those precedents made it particularly difficult for plaintiffs to challenge federal agencies’ support for others’ systemic discrimination.
1. Standing.
Standing doctrine, premised on Article III’s limits on the federal judiciary’s powers, requires a plaintiff to “allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct
and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”335 In the mid1970s, the Court began to tighten standing requirements, making
it increasingly difficult for plaintiffs to challenge government’s actions vis-à-vis others, even when such official acts seemed to directly bolster illegal acts.

334 See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR: HOW YOUR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BECAME UNENFORCEABLE (2017); STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN
FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL
LITIGATION (2017); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1 (2010).
335 Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
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Prior decades had seen the federal courts loosen standing requirements—now the tide shifted.336 Of particular significance,
the Court began to scrutinize the causal connection between a
plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s alleged illegality. Illegality
that simply increased the plaintiff’s risk of harm—and that was
mediated by others’ responses to government actions—became
harder to challenge.337 The paradigm example lay in plaintiffs’ attempts to challenge lax or nonexistent regulation or enforcement
by government—a recurring dispute across all fields of administrative law.338 The question now was: Did the government’s actions or inaction truly cause the plaintiff’s harm, or would the
plaintiff have suffered the same injury in any case, regardless of
what the government did? If the latter, then a judicial remedy
could not redress the plaintiff’s injury.
For the Fifth Amendment no-aid principle, this newly restrictive standing doctrine suggested that plaintiffs who wished to
challenge government subsidies for discriminatory institutions
would have to show that absent the subsidies, the funding recipients would not have engaged in the discrimination at all. That, of
course, was a demanding, inherently speculative inquiry.339 In
Norwood, the Court had not required any precise parsing of the
role that government textbook loans played in increasing white
exodus to segregation academies.340 Now, however, such causal
questions came to the forefront.
A civil rights suit provided an inroad for the Court to begin
tightening causation requirements. In 1975, the Court rejected a
fair housing challenge to Rochester’s zoning law in Warth v.
Seldin341 on the grounds that the plaintiffs had failed to show that
the city’s restrictions on builders were linked to their own inability to find affordable housing there.342 In the majority’s view, the
plaintiffs offered only “the remote possibility . . . that their situation
might have been better had [Rochester officials] acted otherwise.”343
The following year, the Court reaffirmed that “indirectness of
[an] injury . . . ‘may make it substantially more difficult’” to

336 See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 227–28
(1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1432, 1432–33, 1441–46, 1451–55 (1988).
337 Sunstein, supra note 336, at 1452, 1458.
338 Id.
339 Id. at 1458.
340 Norwood, 413 U.S. at 465–66.
341 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
342 Id. at 502–08.
343 Id. at 507.
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satisfy standing requirements, particularly causation and redressability.344 In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Organization,345 the Court ruled that indigent plaintiffs lacked
standing to challenge the IRS’s loosening of its rules requiring
nonprofit hospitals to care for the poor; they failed to show that
the weakened policy had any direct impact on their own inability
to obtain care at particular hospitals.346 Concurring only in the
judgment, Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall
sharply disagreed. Justice Brennan pointed out where the decision
might lead—specifically, to overruling precedents sustaining
challenges to tax exemptions for racially segregated schools
and clubs, like Green and McGlotten.347 Justice Brennan proved
prescient.
Plaintiffs’ standing to challenge tax exemptions for segregated schools came before the Court less than a decade later, only
a year after the Bob Jones decision. In Allen v. Wright, the Court
sharply limited plaintiffs’ ability to sue the federal government to
ensure that the no-tax-aid principle was enforced in practice.348
Parents of Black schoolchildren in desegregating districts had
challenged the IRS’s failure to strictly enforce the nondiscrimination mandate against private, tax-exempt schools; in effect, the
government was helping fund segregation academies.349
The Allen majority acknowledged the illegality of federal subsidies for discriminatory private schools, citing Bob Jones multiple times. But Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for the
Court, held that the plaintiffs’ pleadings did not sufficiently indicate that federal tax subsidies reduced their own ability to attend
desegregated public schools.350 Plaintiffs had not met the requirement that their injury be “fairly traceable” to the government’s
unlawful conduct or be redressable by a shift in that conduct because the specific impact of the tax benefits on such schools’ existence, enrollment, or racial policies could not be precisely
known.351 While the Internal Revenue Code might prohibit tax
subsidies for discriminatory schools, Allen’s outcome indicated

344 Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 44–45 (1976) (quoting Warth, 422
U.S. at 505).
345 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
346 Id. at 32–34, 41–44.
347 Id. at 63–64 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
348 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
349 Congress itself had blocked the agency from adopting stricter policies during the
Carter administration. See Johnson, supra note 304, at 135–38.
350 Allen, 468 U.S. at 743–45.
351 Id. at 746, 757–59.
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that actual enforcement of the prohibition would be left largely to
executive branch discretion.
The dissenting Justices could not fathom the difference between Allen and prior cases like Norwood. Those past decisions,
they argued, held that standing’s causation requirement was amply satisfied in the situation of “subsidies given [to] private
schools that practice racial discrimination.”352 No deference was
due to the IRS’s enforcement decisions when the plaintiffs alleged
that the agency was “violating a specific constitutional limitation
on its enforcement discretion.”353 No agency had the discretion to
violate the Fifth Amendment.354
Justice Brennan had correctly predicted the outcome of Allen
years earlier when the Court began to tighten plaintiffs’ ability to
challenge government’s action or inaction directly impacting
third parties. Now the Court confirmed that standing doctrine’s
causation and redressability requirements would limit plaintiffs’
ability to sue over federal actions subsidizing discrimination.355
2. Private rights of action.
As the 1970s wore on, the Court also demonstrated its increasing unwillingness to recognize implied private rights of action. Even explicit legal directives are unenforceable by individuals, unless the law’s text or judicial interpretation also supplies
what is known as a “private right of action.” Such a cause of action
enables private litigants to sue to enforce constitutional or statutory rights.356 If a law’s text does not explicitly create a right of
action, courts have sometimes been willing to “imply” one through
interpretation.357
Two of the major Spending Clause civil rights statutes—
Title VI and Title IX—did not expressly create private rights of
action, leading to the preliminary question of whether litigants
could sue to enforce them at all. In 1979, the Court affirmed in
352

Id. at 786–89 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 773–78 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 793 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
354 Id. at 793–94 (first quoting Norwood, 413 U.S. at 467; and then quoting Gilmore,
417 U.S. at 568–69).
355 The Court later continued down the path that it started in Allen. See Lujan v. Defs.
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (“[W]hen the plaintiff is not himself the object of the
government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily
‘substantially more difficult’ to establish.” (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 758)).
356 See generally Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193 (1982) (discussing the historical development of private
rights of action as well as their purpose).
357 See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (providing a four-factor framework for discerning whether “a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one”).
353
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Cannon v. University of Chicago that private individuals could
enforce both statutes against federal funding recipients.358 In
other words, individuals could sue institutions receiving federal
funding over their discrimination, rather than waiting for federal
agencies themselves to enforce the statutes.
However, while Cannon upheld the ability of those experiencing discrimination to sue recipients of federal funding under Title VI and Title IX, the decision came down in a period when the
Court had begun to drastically limit its willingness to read such
causes of action into other federal regulatory schemes.359 Further,
Cannon’s logic indicated that private rights of action should be
recognized in part because such suits against funding recipients
were preferable to litigation against the federal government itself. Those rationales subsequently led many lower courts to reject rights of action running directly against the federal government under Title VI or its analogues.360
As with Allen’s restrictions on standing, the lower courts’ failure to find an implied private right of action against the federal
government under the Spending Clause Civil Rights statutes
meant that the executive branch would be largely free to enforce
Title VI and Title IX—or not—as it chose. The statutory no-aid
principle existed, but the federal government could not be required to implement it, insofar as no individual could challenge
federal funding of discrimination in court.
3. Review of agency inaction.
For plaintiffs challenging federal funding for discrimination
but blocked from relying upon Title VI or similar statutes, the
APA offers a potential alternative. The APA supplies a default,
generalized cause of action for suits alleging that federal agencies
are violating the law. Suit may be brought by any “person suffering legal wrong . . . or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action,” unless a relevant statute precludes judicial review or
358 441 U.S. 677, 688–89 (1979); see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280
(2001) (acknowledging Cannon’s holding while limiting the scope of Title VI’s private right
of action to challenges to intentional discrimination).
359 See, e.g., Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15–16 (1979)
(stating that the judicial role is limited to discerning whether Congress intended to authorize such rights of action); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979)
(same); see also Cort, 422 U.S. at 80–85 (refusing to find an implied right of action under
a federal criminal statute governing corporate expenditures for political campaigns).
360 See, e.g., Women’s Equity Action League v. Cavazos (WEAL II), 906 F.2d 742 (D.C.
Cir. 1990). In fact, the majority opinion in Cannon assumed that such suits were possible
while acknowledging that they might be intrusive.
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“agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.”361 The
agency action at issue must either be “made reviewable by statute” or represent “final agency action for which there is no other
adequate remedy in a court.”362
In 1985, the Supreme Court significantly expanded the category
of agency action deemed unreviewable under the APA in a
decision boding poorly for plaintiffs seeking to bring no-aid
claims. In Heckler v. Chaney, the Court ruled that agency decisions to refuse to bring enforcement actions would be presumed
unreviewable, as determinations “committed to agency discretion
by law.”363 Such decisions were uniquely within administrators’
competence, the majority reasoned; further, inaction did not involve coercive government interference with liberty or property.364
Overcoming the presumption against review would be possible
only if Congress indicated that it intended to allow suit and supplied meaningful standards limiting the agency’s enforcement
discretion.
Yet Heckler left open the possibility that enforcing the Fifth
Amendment’s no-aid principle remained viable under the APA.
Then-Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
acknowledged that the presumption against judicial review might
not apply “where . . . the agency has ‘consciously and expressly
adopted a general policy’ that is so extreme as to amount to an
abdication of its statutory responsibilities.”365 The Court cited
Adams v. Richardson, the litigation challenging federal education
officials’ failure to enforce Title VI against segregated schools, as
an example of such “abdication.”366 Further, the majority noted
that the Heckler ruling did not address situations where an
agency’s nonenforcement itself violated constitutional rights.367
Claims that a federal agency had violated the Fifth Amendment
by willfully ignoring systemic discrimination by its funding recipients might therefore survive.

361

5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a), 702.
5 U.S.C. § 704.
363 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 823–24, 832–35 (1985) (interpreting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)); see
also Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction after Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 653, 664 (1985).
364 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832.
365 Id. at 833 n.4.
366 Id.
367 Id. at 838.
362
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Justice Marshall alone refused to join the Heckler opinion,
concurring in the judgment.368 Decades earlier, as the head of the
NAACP’s litigation arm, Justice Marshall led the fight against
federal agencies’ active support for segregation, helping craft the
Fifth Amendment no-aid arguments at their origin. Now, he
wrote that “the problems and dangers of agency inaction are too
important” to evade scrutiny.369
B. The D.C. Circuit: Federal Courts Will Not Oversee the
Overseer
Together, Allen, the post-Cannon cases, and Heckler established significant roadblocks for plaintiffs wishing to challenge
federal funding for others’ systemic discrimination. In a crucial
series of decisions from the 1980s onward, the D.C. Circuit built
upon the barriers erected by the Supreme Court. The court found
no need for plaintiffs to directly challenge federal agencies, even
if they overtly funded discrimination by others, so long as the
plaintiffs could sue the funding recipients themselves.
The D.C. Circuit was the natural court to hear these suits,
given its “special responsibility to review legal challenges to the
conduct of the national government.”370 And, given the court’s
changing composition in this period, it was also unsurprising that
it moved to constrict enforcement.
Liberal lions like Judges J. Skelly Wright, Harold Leventhal,
David Bazelon, and Spottswood Robinson once dominated the
court.371 By the early 1980s, as “the last bastion of liberalism” in
a federal judiciary moving steadily rightward, the D.C. Circuit
faced dramatically high rates of Supreme Court review and reversal, sometimes with “harsh words of rebuke” from the Justices.372

368 Id. at 840 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Brennan joined the
majority opinion but authored a separate concurrence. Id. at 839 (Brennan, J., concurring).
369 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 854 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
370 John G. Roberts, Jr., What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A Historical View, 92
VA. L. REV. 375, 389 (2006).
371 See Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking’s Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139, 1185 (2001); Al Kamen, U.S. Court’s
Liberal Era Ending, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1985, at A1.
372 Stuart Taylor, Jr., A Time of Transition for the No. 2 Court, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8,
1982), https://perma.cc/H47T-XE8Z (quoting leading civil rights lawyer Joseph Rauh, Jr.);
Stuart Taylor, Jr., Washington’s Alternate Current Crackles in the ‘D.C. Circuit’, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 4, 1981), https://perma.cc/T55P-NKDS (referencing then-Justice Rehnquist’s
opinion overturning the D.C. Circuit decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978)); see also Roy W. McLeese III, Disagreement in D.C.: The Relationship Between the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit and Its Implications for a National Court of Appeals, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1048, 1049–50 (1984) (finding that in the 1980–
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But as President Ronald Reagan appointed conservatives like
Judges Robert Bork, Antonin Scalia, and Kenneth Starr to the
D.C. Circuit, the court’s liberals were increasingly at odds not just
with the high court but with their colleagues.373 A key divide
within the D.C. Circuit centered on the legitimacy of judicial review of federal agencies’ decision-making, which manifested particularly in the courts’ decisions about standing. Conservatives
pushed to limit standing to challenge agency actions, while liberals favored more expansive interpretations.374 In 1986, President
Reagan achieved a majority on the court, leading an observer to
comment that the Republican president had “taken the most liberal court in America and turned it into the most conservative.”375
Civil rights litigants’ attempts to enforce the no-aid principle
thus fit within a larger, partisan-tinged struggle over the limits
of courts’ power to monitor the administrative state. That procedural struggle overlapped with the broader goals of the conservative legal movement, which pushed back against the “rights revolution” of the 1960s and 1970s not just by narrowing the
substantive reach of the Constitution and civil rights laws but
also by attempting to limit litigation more generally.
The key D.C. Circuit cases played out on the domain of APA
reviewability. Rather than rule that suits challenging federal
subsidies for discrimination failed for lack of standing or that
Heckler barred review of such administrative “inaction,” the D.C.
Circuit instead relied upon the APA’s requirement that “no other
adequate remedy in a court” be available.376 Judges reasoned that
suits against federal officials to stop the subsidies were unnecessary; so long as individuals could sue the funding recipients
directly, the suit against the funding recipient provided the
“adequate remedy.”

1983 terms, the Court granted certiorari to review D.C. Circuit decisions three times more
often than it did for the other circuits, and the Court reversed the D.C Circuit nearly four
times more often).
373 See Nancy Lewis, Factions’ Squabbling Rocks U.S. Court of Appeals Here, WASH.
POST., Aug. 1, 1987, at A1.
374 See McLeese, supra note 372, at 1049–57 (discussing disagreement between the
Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit over “the costs and benefits of federal judicial supervision” and “federal judicial protection of the interests of the other branches of the federal
government”); Patricia M. Wald, The D.C. Circuit: Here and Now, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
718, 719–23 (1987) (discussing constricting standing doctrine).
375 Philip Shenon, Shift Gives Reagan D.C. Circuit Majority, N.Y. TIMES, May 24,
1986, at 7 (quoting civil rights lawyer Joseph Rauh, Jr.). Republican appointees made up
two-thirds of the court by 1991. Patricia M. Wald, “. . . Doctor, Lawyer, Merchant, Chief”,
60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1128 (1992).
376 5 U.S.C. § 704.
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Thus, the theory that the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection mandate constrained federal officials from subsidizing others’ discrimination fell away. Instead, the judges characterized
the legal problem as one of federal officials enforcing statutory
civil rights mandates against others, a framing that suggested
officials could use their discretion to decide whether or not to enforce Title VI and its analogues at all.
The D.C. Circuit’s movement to halt plaintiff suits attacking
federal subsidies for discrimination began with Council of & for
the Blind of Delaware County Valley, Inc. v. Regan.377 In 1976, a
group of minority organizations and individuals had sued the
Treasury for failing to enforce statutory antidiscrimination requirements attached to federal revenue-sharing funds.378 In this
new suit, originally captioned Committee for Full Employment v.
Blumenthal,379 the plaintiffs argued that the Treasury Department’s Office of Revenue Sharing had refused to act on their complaints alleging discrimination by the recipient local governments, thereby defaulting on Treasury’s statutory obligations to
ensure nondiscrimination in the programs it funded.380 The plaintiffs appeared to model their suit on Adams v. Richardson, the
NAACP litigation challenging federal education officials’ refusal
to enforce Title VI desegregation mandates against southern
schools, which remained ongoing.
The D.C. Circuit initially gave the green light to the suit in
1979, just before the court’s composition began to shift. The district court had refused to find standing, emphasizing Simon’s constraints on third-party challenges to governmental failures to enforce legal mandates against others.381 But the D.C. Circuit
reversed, ruling that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged injury
via violations of their procedural rights, as the agency failed to
follow its own regulations regarding the required investigations.382 Further, the panel suggested that plaintiffs might well be
able to show that termination of federal funds would in fact force
the recipient governments to halt their discrimination, satisfying
the causation and redressability requirements for their substantive injuries.383 The precedents of the 1970s weighed in their
377

709 F.2d 1521 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc).
Id. at 1524.
379 606 F.2d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
380 Comm. for Full Emp. v. Blumenthal, 606 F.2d 1062, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1979) aff’d sub
nom. Council of & for the Blind, 709 F.2d 1521.
381 Blumenthal, 606 F.2d at 1063–65.
382 Id. at 1065.
383 Id. at 1066.
378
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favor—after all, the plaintiffs’ theory was just another iteration
of suits like Adams and Gautreaux challenging federal government support for unconstitutional discrimination.384
Three years later, however, a sharply divided en banc majority
viewed matters differently, with a single vote from then-Judge
Ruth Bader Ginsburg deciding the outcome.385 After the first decision in the suit, Congress had amended the Revenue Sharing
Act to include an explicit private right of action against the funding recipients but not federal agencies themselves.386 That legislative move now the cast plaintiffs’ efforts in a distinct light.
The Council of & for the Blind majority held that neither the
Revenue Sharing Act nor the APA gave the plaintiffs the right to
sue the federal agencies providing funding. As to the Revenue
Sharing Act, the majority cited evidence that Congress feared
that subjecting the federal government to suit would render it “a
defendant in every civil rights case involving revenue sharing
funds,” straining its enforcement capacity.387 Further, the APA’s
general cause of action was available only where “no other adequate
remedy in a court” could be had.388 The majority concluded that
litigation against the funding recipients sufficed.389 No suit need
lie against the federal agencies, even if they knowingly funded
others’ discrimination.
In fact, the en banc majority warned against allowing individuals to sue over an agency’s nationwide civil rights policy. That
could “empower one district judge to act as supreme supervisor of
the [agency]’s enforcement activities—a role more appropriately
reserved for the Executive under the oversight of Congress.”390
Finally, the majority characterized the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment
claim as simply a procedural challenge to the agency’s “failure to
process their discrimination complaints in the manner required by
the Revenue Sharing Act,” which did not involve any cognizable
constitutional claim at all.391

384 Citing Adams and Gautreaux, the court noted that “[c]ourts on several occasions
have granted relief to plaintiffs who sought to compel administrative fund termination or
other civil rights enforcement activities under [similar] statutes.” Id. at 1066 n.19.
385 Council of & for the Blind, 709 F.2d at 1521. Then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg
provided the key vote to a bloc of conservatives, including then-Judge Antonin Scalia and
Judge Robert Bork.
386 Id. at 1524.
387 Id. at 1529 (emphasis omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1165, pt. 1, at 112 (1976).
388 Id. at 1531 (emphasis omitted) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 704).
389 Id. at 1531–33.
390 Council of & for the Blind, 709 F.2d at 1532.
391 Id. at 1533.
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Judge Spottswood Robinson wrote for the dissenters. Decades
earlier as an NAACP lawyer, Judge Robinson had argued before
the Supreme Court in Brown.392 He knew the stakes of holding the
national government accountable for funding discrimination.
Judge Robinson argued that APA review should be available if
the plaintiffs successfully certified a class. Individual suits
against “the many thousands of” funding recipients would not adequately substitute for litigation challenging the agency’s
“cho[ice] to dispense huge sums in flagrant violation of statutory
procedures implementing the nondiscrimination commands of the
Act.”393 It was that ability to shift nationwide policy that was key
to civil rights’ groups strategy in enacting Title VI and its analogues in the first instance, as well as in suing to force federal
agencies to implement them.
To Judge Robinson, the majority’s decision left the agency
“completely free to ignore the requirements of the Act” and
“wholly insulated from judicial review; indeed, it may close its
eyes to allegations of discrimination, and dispense vast sums of
shared revenues to the very entities about which citizens complain.”394 The court had turned its back on holding federal agencies accountable for their role in fueling discrimination, a sharp
divergence from cases like Adams and Green in which the judiciary had “unhesitantly”395 enforced the no-aid principle.
Seven years later, another D.C. Circuit panel affirmed Council
of & for the Blind in a similarly structured suit. The case, Coker
v. Sullivan,396 did not involve civil rights or the background Fifth
Amendment principle barring federal support for discrimination.
Instead, homeless families sued to force the Department of Health
and Human Services to properly monitor states’ denials of emergency assistance within programs relying upon federal funding.397
Then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote for the panel, rejecting the claims for lack of standing and the absence of an APA
cause of action. The court’s prior decision in Council of & for the
Blind, she explained, reflected federal judges’ desire to avoid
monitoring all federal agency enforcement.398 The APA mandated
that “if other remedies are adequate, federal courts will not
392 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 484 (listing then-attorney Robinson as counsel in cases
numbered 1, 2, 4, and 10).
393 709 F.2d at 1548–49 (Robinson, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
394 Id. at 1550–1552, 1552 n.85.
395 Id. at 1552.
396 902 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
397 Id. at 85–87.
398 Id. at 89.
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oversee the overseer.”399 Heckler buttressed their conclusion that
“judges are not well positioned to guide agency enforcement” of
such statutory mandates.400
A month later, then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg again
wrote for a D.C. Circuit panel to kill off the sprawling, decadeslong Adams litigation on similar grounds.401 Now captioned as
Women’s Equity Action League v. Cavazos (WEAL II),402 the Adams
litigation had “expanded to colossal proportions.”403 By the late
1970s, the suit had grown to cover not just Title VI and race discrimination, but also sex discrimination under Title IX and disability discrimination under Section 504. A 1977 consent decree
put the D.C. District Court in the position of overseeing the
Department of Education’s civil rights enforcement across the
entire nation.404
An earlier WEAL405 panel in 1989 had upheld standing, distinguishing Allen v. Wright on the ground that the student plaintiffs in the present litigation alleged “direct injury” from being enrolled in discriminatory institutions receiving federal funding.406
Then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for that WEAL I
panel, cited prior D.C. Circuit decisions like Committee for Full
Employment, Velde, and Adams for the proposition that “federal
funding of facilities that engage in proscribed discrimination is in
part causative of the perpetuation of such discrimination.”407
But now the WEAL II court ruled that even if the plaintiffs
had standing, neither Congress nor the Constitution had authorized such suits. No cause of action existed under the civil rights
statutes, the APA, the Mandamus Act,408 or the Constitution for
what the court described as an attempt to obtain “across-theboard continuing federal court supervision of the process by which
the agencies ensure compliance with the antidiscrimination

399

Id.
Id. at 88–90.
401 See generally WEAL II, 906 F.2d 742. Then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s vote in
WEAL II proved politically controversial. See Martin D. Ginsburg, Some Reflections on
Imperfection, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 949, 953–54 (2007) (describing women’s organizations’ original antipathy toward Justice Ginsburg’s nomination to the Supreme Court and linking it
to her WEAL II decision).
402 906 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
403 Id. at 744.
404 Id. at 745.
405 Women’s Equity Action League v. Cavazos (WEAL I), 879 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
406 Id. at 884–85.
407 Id. at 885–86.
408 Pub. L. No. 87-748, 76 Stat. 744 (1962) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1361).
400
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mandates.”409 In contrast to the plaintiffs’ sweeping allegations,
key 1970s decisions like Gautreaux and Shannon had involved
only “situation-specific suits against the federal agency based on
federal funding of a particular project or district.”410
Cannon, the panel wrote, expressed disapproval of “suit[s]
against the government to terminate federal funding”—even as it
approved an implied private right of action against the discriminating fund recipients.411 None of the court’s own decisions recognized an implied right of action under Title VI that could run
against federal agencies.412 Possibly leaving a small opening for
future suits, the court seemed to distinguish instances where the
federal agency was charged “as provider of financial assistance,
with facilitating or encouraging a specific fund recipient’s discrimination.”413 Perhaps litigation that did not challenge a federal
agency’s entire civil rights enforcement wholesale, but instead focused on specific recipients and suggested active federal “facilitation” of discrimination could still squeeze through.
In the WEAL II panel’s view, Council of & for the Blind controlled the question of an APA cause of action. None existed because an adequate remedy existed in suits against the funding
recipients themselves. Again, the court relied on Cannon as indicating that Congress preferred to authorize only such suits, not
suits against federal agencies themselves.414 It did not matter that
piecemeal suits against individual recipients of federal funding
would likely “be more arduous” and “less effective” as a means to
challenge overall national policy.415
Regarding the Fifth Amendment claim, the WEAL II panel
reasoned that no substantive Fifth Amendment equal protection
principle was at stake, simply a right to adequate procedure:
“[A]n agency’s failure to process discrimination complaints in the
manner required by federal statutes and regulations does not deprive complainants of constitutional rights.”416
In subsequent years, the barriers hardened with a trilogy of
D.C. Circuit decisions that confronted moves to enforce the no-aid
principle from the right. Liberal judges now wrote for the court,
citing Council of & for the Blind to shut down such litigation.
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416

WEAL II, 906 F.2d at 748.
Id. at 749.
Id. at 749–50.
Id. at 748–49 (discussing Council of & for the Blind and Coker).
Id. at 750.
WEAL II, 906 F.2d at 751.
Id.
Id. at 752.
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Conservatives and liberals seemingly agreed that there was no
place for the judiciary in monitoring federal agencies’ compliance
with the no-aid principle.
In 1993, in Washington Legal Foundation v. Alexander,417
white students brought suit to force the Department of Education
to issue regulations prohibiting federally funded institutions from
offering scholarships demarcated for racial minorities, arguing
that such scholarships were a form of unlawful discrimination under Title VI.418 For those who argued that a supposedly colorblind
Constitution barred any form of affirmative action, Title VI would
also bar any institution receiving federal funds from operating
such programs.
Judge Harry Edwards, once a dissenter in Council of & for the
Blind, now wrote for the panel to reject the suit, reasoning that
Council of & for the Blind and WEAL II doomed the plaintiffs’
claims. The Washington Legal Foundation plaintiffs tried to evade
those decisions’ force by relying on Adams v. Richardson (and
Heckler’s saving reference to it). Their claim was distinct, they
posited, because they had alleged the Department of Education’s
express abdication of its statutory duties.419 In response, the D.C.
Circuit panel narrowed Adams’ significance still further. Judge
Edwards noted that Adams had involved the department’s refusal
to take enforcement action after its own express findings of discrimination.420 Without such express agency findings, Adams
simply had no force—meaning that such suits would be possible
in only the rare instance when an agency was transparent enough
to explicitly find violations of Title VI while nonetheless refusing
to do anything in response.
Adams suffered another blow the next year, when another
liberal D.C. Circuit judge authored a panel decision rejecting a
right-of-center group’s attempt to challenge federal Title VI policy. In Freedom Republicans v. Federal Election Commission,421
the plaintiffs argued that the Republican National Party’s
417

984 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
Id. at 484–85.
419 Id. at 487.
420 Id. at 487–88. The decision exemplifies a prevailing approach to the Heckler “abdication exception” in which courts refuse to find APA review available unless the agency
has explicitly stated a general policy of nonenforcement in a formal guidance or rule. See
Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Peña, 37 F.3d 671, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Andrew Shi,
Comment, Reviewing Refusal: Lethal Injection, the FDA, and the Courts, 168 U. PA. L.
REV. 245, 259–61 (2019). Other courts refuse to find abdication where any level of enforcement occurs, no matter how slight. See Jentry Lanza, Comment, Agency Underenforcement
as Reviewable Abdication, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1171, 1179–80 (2018).
421 13 F.3d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
418
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delegate allocation scheme discriminated against racial minorities.422 Because the Federal Election Commission helped fund the
Republican National Convention, the plaintiffs argued that the
agency must enforce Title VI, halt the funding, and issue regulations governing the political parties it funded.423 Judge Wald
relied on Simon and Allen to conclude that the plaintiffs had
failed to show that the federal funding had any impact on the
Republicans’ delegation-selection system, or that threatening to
withhold funding would lead the party to change the selection
system. Thus, standing was foreclosed.424 Distinguishing WEAL I,
Velde, and Adams, which allowed such litigation to proceed,
Judge Wald wrote that the Supreme Court’s more recent standing
decisions had undermined them.425
A decade later, Judge Edwards again rejected conservatives’
attempt to rely upon the no-aid principle in National Wrestling
Coaches Ass’n v. Department of Education.426 Organizations of
men’s college wrestling coaches, athletes, and alumni had sued
the Department of Education to challenge the agency’s Title IX
guidance, which they argued led colleges to cut men’s wrestling
programs to achieve greater gender parity in athletics. They
claimed that the Department’s interpretation amounted to reverse discrimination against men, conflicting with Title IX and
the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee as well as reflecting an Adams-style abdication of the agency’s Title IX enforcement responsibilities.427 Citing Warth, Simon, and Allen,
Judge Edwards ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing.428 Colleges might still cut men’s wrestling even if the agency were to
withdraw its guidance.429
Judge Edwards also ruled that APA review was unavailable
under Washington Legal Foundation, WEAL II, and Council of &
for the Blind. Under Washington Legal Foundation, the decision
that he had authored a decade earlier, suit was “plainly barred”:
no APA cause of action was available, and the Adams abdication

422

Id. at 412.
Id. at 414–15.
424 Id. at 418–19.
425 Id. at 416–17 (emphasizing that Lujan required “more exacting scrutiny” of causation).
426 366 F.3d 930 (D.C. Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Perry Cap. LLC v.
Mnuchin, 864 F.3d 591 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
427 Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 366 F. 3d at at 934–36.
428 Id. at 938.
429 Id. Prior D.C. Circuit decisions, like Freedom Republicans, required “formidable
evidence” of causation in challenges to government treatment of third parties. Id. at 942.
423
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claim was viable only when the agency had continued funding after expressly finding discrimination by the funding recipient.430
Reversing the usual ideological divide, Judge Stephen
Williams, a prominent conservative jurist, dissented, arguing that
the plaintiffs had met standing’s causation and redressability requirements. Judge Williams argued that Warth, Simon, and Allen
turned only on the plaintiffs’ failure to plead adequate facts supporting those requirements, rather than on “the theoretically
speculative nature of their claims.”431 Moreover, suits against the
individual colleges did not provide a remedy sufficient to preclude
APA review, as the plaintiffs wanted the Department of Education
to engage in new rulemaking, revising its interpretation of Title IX
for the nation as a whole.432 Judge Williams thereby recognized
what civil rights plaintiffs had long understood: forcing federal
agencies to comply with the Fifth Amendment as a matter of
broad national policy was a much more important goal (and of
distinct constitutional significance) than halting discrimination
by a single funding recipient.
Thus, Democratic appointees like Judges Edwards and Wald
emphatically shut the door to litigants seeking colorblindness in
federally funded programs,433 contesting policies surrounding the
selection of delegates,434 or challenging “gender proportionality” in
federally funded universities’ athletics.435 By the time of National
Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, conservative and liberal judges had
nearly switched stances, with Judge Williams, a Reagan appointee,
arguing in dissent for a more lenient application of standing
doctrine.436
With this final set of D.C. Circuit decisions, Adams also lost
most of its remaining practical power as a precedent for litigants
to challenge the federal government’s application of the no-aid
principle. Many observers probably did not mourn the demise of
the Adams litigation. The litigation had been characterized as
spinning out of control, permitting a court to micromanage an
agency’s entire federal civil rights enforcement over many years and
leading even Democratic appointees to complain of its burdens.437
430

Id. at 945–47.
Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 366 F. 3d at 955–56 (Williams, J., dissenting).
432 Id. at 958.
433 Wash. Legal Found., 984 F.2d at 487–88.
434 Freedom Republicans, 13 F.3d at 419.
435 Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 366 F.3d at 942.
436 See id. at 951 (Williams, J., dissenting).
437 See, e.g., HALPERN, supra note 205, at 94–153, 308–09; JEREMY RABKIN, JUDICIAL
COMPULSIONS: HOW PUBLIC LAW DISTORTS PUBLIC POLICY 148–81 (1989); Kenyon D.
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C. Title VI in Other Courts
Across the country, other courts also confronted the question
of whether Title VI and its sibling statutes authorized private
rights of action against federal agencies to challenge agency funding of discrimination. Two general approaches emerged. The less
restrictive position recognized a cause of action against federal
agencies in instances “where plaintiffs allege that the agency itself has violated the federal statute.”438 Or, as the Second Circuit
put it, quoting Adams:
[I]n narrow circumstances involving allegations that the
agency has “consciously and expressly” abdicated its enforcement duties, that the agency is using improper procedures
for approving funded programs, that it acquiesced or actively
participated in discriminatory practices, or that it has
wrongly refused to pursue further action when efforts to
achieve voluntary compliance have failed.439
Others took a harder line, similar to that of the D.C. Circuit
in WEAL II, rejecting the right of action as a general matter. In
some of those instances, the courts confronted an individual litigant seeking to challenge the federal agency’s resolution of its
complaint against a funding recipient for a particular incident of
discrimination—rather than confronting allegations of intentional federal support for known, systemic discrimination
throughout a funded program.440 In those less-compelling, one-off
circumstances, it is unsurprising that courts rejected the claim.
But other courts flatly rejected the cause of action even in cases
involving more systemic discrimination by the funding recipient.441
Thus, in a few places, precedent might allow for a suit alleging
that the federal government had violated Title VI or other

Bunch & Grant B. Mindle, Judicial Activism and the Administration of Civil Rights Policy,
1993 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 76, 77–78.
438 Little Earth of United Tribes v. HUD, 584 F. Supp. 1292, 1297 (D. Minn. 1983).
439 Marlow v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 820 F.2d 581, 583 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (first
citing Adams, 480 F.2d at 1162; then citing Shannon, 436 F.2d at 820; then citing Gautreaux, 448 F.2d at 740; and then citing Hardy v. Leonard, 377 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal.
1974)); see also Davis v. Ball Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 640 F.2d 30, 46–47 (7th Cir. 1980) (noting
that a right of action is available when “federal agencies not only failed to meet an enforcement obligation, but actually declined to act in the face of clear wrongdoing at the
state level”).
440 See, e.g., Salvador v. Bennett, 800 F.2d 97, 98–99 (7th Cir. 1986); Scherer v. United
States, 241 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1286–88 (D. Kan. 2003).
441 See, e.g., Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass’n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180, 191 (4th
Cir. 1999); NAACP v. Med. Ctr., Inc., 599 F.2d 1247, 1254 n.27 (3d Cir. 1979); Cmty. Bhd.
of Lynn, Inc. v. Lynn Redevelopment Auth., 523 F. Supp. 779, 780–82 (D. Mass. 1981).
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Spending Clause civil rights statutes by knowingly funding discrimination. But that opening for litigation is slim at best.
***
Civil rights advocates had labored for decades to establish a
key constitutional principle: the federal government should not
use its vast Spending Clause powers to entrench apartheid in the
United States. That ideal represented the advocates’ attempt to
harmonize the New Deal state’s signature set of social programs
(backed by federal dollars but implemented by state and local
officials) with the Reconstruction Amendments’ promise of racial
equality. In doctrinal terms, it meant that the Fifth Amendment
barred federal approval of, participation in, and subsidies for racial
segregation and other forms of discrimination—a no-aid principle.
Despite initial skepticism, federal courts and policymakers
embraced this proposition as black-letter law by the end of the
1970s. Over the next decade, though, procedural obstacles proliferated. Some obstacles represented a broader trend toward restricting litigation access—as with the Supreme Court’s limitations on standing and the availability of statutory review under
the APA—while other decisions focused specifically on limiting
review under the Spending Clause civil rights statutes. The D.C.
Circuit amplified the obstacles to Fifth Amendment enforcement,
and other courts ruled similarly.
In the present, that procedural gauntlet means that plaintiffs
generally cannot use the APA or Spending Clause civil rights statutes to challenge the federal government’s funding of discrimination by others, even when that discrimination is systemic, intentional, and well-known to federal officials. Federal civil rights
policy across the scope of federally funded programs is largely immune to judicial oversight. The primary exception may be for the
constitutional claim itself. Litigants might be able to bring a Fifth
Amendment no-aid claim for injunctive relief against federal officials themselves, under the doctrine of Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.442 However, plaintiffs would still need to

442 337 U.S. 682 (1949). Shortly after its decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Court endorsed a similar
action for Fifth Amendment equal protection claims. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,
248–49 (1979). It is highly unlikely, though, that courts would sanction a Bivens-type damages action against officials for Fifth Amendment no-aid claims, given the Court’s more
recent trend of rejecting Bivens claims in new contexts. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct.
1843, 1857–63 (2017) (“[T]he Court has made clear that expanding the Bivens remedy is
now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.” (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009))).
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overcome the standing hurdles created by Allen, and the available
relief would be limited.
Profound substantive questions persist regarding how far the
Constitution goes in limiting federal Spending Clause programs
from aiding discrimination. Still more questions remain open regarding the federal government’s remedial responsibilities for
funding past discrimination. Yet procedural barriers have prevented those debates from occurring. The substantive law itself
remains frozen—preserved in decades-old decisions that suggest
strong constitutional restraints and responsibilities but have yet
to be seriously tested. The next Part probes the reasons for that
constitutional silence and its significance for the United States in
the present.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL SILENCE
Why did courts stop enforcing the Fifth Amendment no-aid
principle, and why does it matter? This Part argues that the federal courts withdrew from enforcing the no-aid principle for multiple, interrelated reasons.
First, as conservatives moved to restrict equal protection jurisprudence, courts faced an increasingly challenging set of doctrinal
concerns regarding the no-aid principle. Dismissing such claims on
procedural grounds allowed judges of all ideological stripes to avoid
looming, difficult questions of constitutional substance.
Second, by the 1980s, sustained backlash to judicial “activism” left courts fatigued and doubtful about their capacity to monitor other governmental institutions. The scope of the federal government’s sweeping Spending Clause programs added to courts’
reluctance to intervene.
Third, judges and other legal actors seemed to have forgotten—or repressed—the ways in which the federal government
had actively aided Jim Crow as well as civil rights advocates’
long-term struggle to use the Constitution to block that aid. In
fact, the enactment of Title VI and its analogues seems to have
aided the process of forgetting, allowing the federal government
to be framed as an enforcer of civil rights—not a potential violator
in its own right.
Together, those factors made it easy for courts to withdraw
and for the no-aid principle to slip into disuse. But the resulting
constitutional silence is costly. Some costs are inflicted on the law
itself, by preventing litigants from challenging federal agencies’
past and present use of federal funds to support systemic discrimination. Obscuring the Fifth Amendment claims also damages our
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nation’s ability to debate key constitutional principles on the merits. It makes it easier to forget the federal government’s long history of involvement in racial apartheid and the civil rights campaigns that challenged that federal complicity. The idea that our
fundamental law might require federal action to repair those
harms goes undiscussed.
Reckoning with the Fifth Amendment would be difficult and
fraught. For liberals in particular, engaging with the Fifth
Amendment no-aid principle would lay bare significant tensions
within some of legal liberalism’s proudest twentieth-century accomplishments: the New Deal state, the Warren Court’s constitutional revolution, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Liberals have
no easy path to resolve those tensions.
But the costs of silence are even greater. At the very least,
the principle should be considered and debated on the merits, rather than left to wither on procedural grounds. Even if the courts
again decide that they are incapable of actively enforcing the
Fifth Amendment norm, they should leave space for the political
branches and the polity as a whole to engage with the norm. It
behooves all of us to consider how best to constrain the Spending
Clause power and how the nation might begin to remedy the long
history of federal aid for discrimination.
A. Why the Courts Withdrew
For a brief period of time, courts emphatically announced and
enforced a Fifth Amendment principle that constrained the federal government. When they stopped, it does not seem that federal judges had come to believe that subsidizing others’ discrimination was lawful; nor had the federal government stopped such
subsidies. Rather, a multitude of other dynamics came into play,
as I discuss below.
1. Substantive doubts.
By the late 1980s, courts faced an increasingly challenging
set of doctrinal concerns regarding the no-aid principle. Procedure
allowed an alternative route to resolve those looming constitutional problems, enabling courts to squelch the Fifth Amendment
principle without needing to say so.
In the prior decade, the conservative legal movement—with
support from centrist and right-leaning jurists—successfully
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restricted the scope of equal protection doctrine.443 In Washington
v. Davis and subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court limited
equal protection doctrine to instances of “intentional” discrimination, suggesting that proof of intent would require a showing that
the actor affirmatively wished to harm racial minorities or other
protected groups.444 Conservatives used Davis to argue that even
knowing federal support for intentional segregation or discrimination—if it did not reflect malevolent intent by federal officials
themselves—did not violate equal protection.445 That position
threatened to vitiate the no-aid principle by insulating any federal subsidy that rested on benign programmatic goals, so long as
federal officials did not manifest overtly racist purposes in allowing federal funds to flow to discriminatory programs.
Another strand of equal protection doctrine restricted the
Court’s previous generous reading of state action doctrine. While
the Norwood Court had no difficulty identifying the provision of
free textbooks as a form of state action supporting segregation
academies, lurking in the background of the no-aid rule was
whether programs of general aid might not qualify as state action
at all. In Bob Jones, DOJ attorneys raised this objection, suggesting that tax subsidies did not enlist the government as a “joint
venturer” in the taxpayer’s discrimination.446 Though the Court
did not adopt this reasoning, its ongoing restriction of state action
doctrine in other cases boded poorly for the no-aid rule, just as
Davis did.
But no court ever drew upon intent doctrine, or state action
principles, to reject the no-aid rule outright. Even for conservative
courts, ruling that the Constitution allows the national government to fund systemic discrimination might have gone too far.
That would amount to stating that it had been perfectly legitimate for the federal government to help build and operate Jim
Crow housing, schools, universities, and hospitals. At a visceral
level, such a declaration would be shocking—at odds with the canonization of Brown and its formal equality mandate.

443 On the movement’s emergence, see generally STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE
CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW (2008).
444 Davis, 426 U.S. at 238–41 (1976); see also Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 279–80 (1979).
445 See Brief of the United States, supra note 314, at 40.
446 Id. Years earlier, in the tuition voucher cases, lower courts clarified that actions
seeking to challenge government subsidies are, of course, challenges to government action.
Therefore, the state action puzzle should arise only when the litigant seeks to constrain
private actors themselves, rather than simply stop the government from providing funding. See supra notes 184–86 and accompanying text.
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Nonetheless, judges that subscribed to the core idea that the
Constitution barred the government from funding de jure segregation likely questioned the broader implications of the no-aid
principle. The courts that initially shaped the no-aid principle did
not necessarily consider how far such a principle might reach,
preoccupied as they were with a singular dilemma—how to transition away from Jim Crow and overcome overt defiance of Brown
by states like Mississippi.447 Later, the no-aid principle’s potential
scope became clear—that it could reach as far as the entire tax
system and make the federal courts responsible for monitoring
civil rights enforcement across the entire executive branch.448
The potential sweep of the no-aid principle made it less likely
that conservatives and centrists would simply find a way to reconcile the doctrine with cases like Davis. Nor would it have been
easy to address the principle’s outer reaches without vitiating the
entire principle. That would require finding defensible stopping
points—either a point at which financial aid is too neutral
or de minimis to police or a point at which knowing funding of
systemic discrimination would equate to intentional discrimination. The courts’ Establishment Clause jurisprudence had already
demonstrated how difficult it was to define clear lines to use in
restricting government funding.
As conservatives reshaped substantive equal protection doctrine, liberals, for their part, must have read the writing on the
wall. Why engage in constitutional battles over the Fifth Amendment if the direction of equal protection doctrine indicated that
they would almost certainly lose? Given deep ideological disputes
over the nature of discrimination itself, some may have concluded
that enforcing the principle would be counterproductive in a judiciary moving rightward. When conservatives sued to bar federal
support for minority-targeted college scholarships in Washington
Legal Foundation, or to prevent enforcement of gender equity in
college sports in National Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, it became
clear that a mandate to halt federal aid for discrimination could
be used to block progressive initiatives.449 Procedural avoidance
offered a means to stem liberal losses without wholesale defeat.

447 See supra Part II.C; supra Part III.A. For one account of that resistance, see generally ERLE JOHNSTON, MISSISSIPPI’S DEFIANT YEARS, 1953-1973: AN INTERPRETIVE
DOCUMENTARY WITH PERSONAL EXPERIENCES (1990).
448 See supra Part III.B (discussing tax subsidy cases and critical responses); supra
Part IV.B (discussing D.C. Circuit cases expressing fear of sweeping judicial oversight).
449 See Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 366 F.3d at 933–36; Wash. Legal Found., 984
F.2d at 484–85.
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2. Backlash and judicial fatigue.
In the 1980s, courts embraced procedural doctrines restricting access to litigation—reflecting a widespread sense that the
courts had taken too prominent a role in social reform—with
equivocal results. Backlash to “activist” judicial interventions had
built for decades. The Warren Court’s jurisprudence had inspired
courts increasingly to issue orders overhauling how major institutions operated, in order to redress and prevent rights violations,
in what were known as “structural injunction[s].”450 Over time,
political attacks, along with disappointment regarding the outcomes of structural reform litigation, fueled legal observers’
doubts about sweeping judicial interventions and oversight of executive officials. Critiques came from the left as well as the right,
challenging whether courts could or should attempt to mandate
social reforms.451
As more conservative judges populated the federal courts,
they led the retreat from active judicial oversight of other institutions.452 And as critique grew of judicial intervention via injunction, conservative figures were particularly likely to take this
view.453 That pattern describes the trajectory of decisions in the
Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit regarding issues such
as standing. By the 1980s, both the Supreme Court and the D.C.
Circuit were moving rightward.454 The Supreme Court moved
right first, producing conflict with the D.C. Circuit for a period,
often over federal courts’ intervention in administrative decisionmaking.455 Withdrawal from active oversight of federal agencies’
compliance with the no-aid principle fit within the larger

450 See OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 9 (1978). See generally Abram
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
451 See generally ALEXANDER M BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF
PROGRESS (1970); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC
POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE (1974); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978). See also Liu, supra note 215, at 718, 732 (discussing the
Court’s apparent “impatience with remedial intervention” and “impatience and exasperation with the decades-long project of school desegregation” by the early 1990s).
452 See Sheldon Goldman, Reagan’s Judicial Legacy: Completing the Puzzle and Summing Up, 72 JUDICATURE 318, 319, 327 (1989) (noting that President Reagan had appointed 47% of active federal judges and sought judges who shared his skepticism toward
“judicial legislation of new rights”).
453 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 421 (2d ed. 1977) (critiquing the Supreme Court for revising the Constitution “under the guise of interpretation”).
454 See Wald, supra note 375, at 1150.
455 See McLeese, supra note 372, at 1059–60, 1060 n.72; Kamen, supra note 371; Shenon,
supra note 375.
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dynamic, as the D.C. Circuit gradually aligned itself with the
Supreme Court in restricting judicial oversight of administrators.456
Even some less conservative judges who might have been
sympathetic to the Fifth Amendment norm probably perceived
the difficulty of overseeing the entire executive branch’s compliance with the norm to be inordinate, likely to wield only uncertain
benefits, and, hence, a misguided use of the courts’ political capital. The D.C. Circuit took great pains to emphasize that it would
not “oversee the overseer,” suggesting that some federal judges
saw the task of addressing federal agencies’ compliance with the
no-aid mandate as one of unmanageable scope.457 The Council of
& for the Blind en banc majority warned that plaintiffs sought
“the broadest possible continuing supervision of an Executive
agency by a court . . . the type of judicial activity which has produced condemnation of the courts for overstepping their proper
role.”458 As Professors Cristina Ceballos, David Engstrom, and
Daniel Ho point out, then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg herself in
WEAL II heavily emphasized the “metastatic tendencies” of such
litigation.459
3. Forgetting—and reframing—the federal government’s role.
As the courts increasingly cited procedural obstacles to enforcing the no-aid norm, judges and other legal actors seemed to
have forgotten, or repressed, the ways in which the federal government had actively aided Jim Crow. They also lost sight of civil
rights advocates’ long-term struggle to use the Constitution to
block that aid.
Statutory success in enacting Title VI and subsequent statutes
barring discrimination in programs enacted under Spending Clause
authority fueled that amnesia. In cases falling within the Spending
Clause civil rights statutes’ scope, judges stopped referencing
the underlying constitutional norm.460 At a minimum, in cases

456 See Patricia M. Wald, Harold Leventhal Talk: Thirty Years of Administrative Law
in the D.C. Circuit, DC BAR (July 1, 1997), https://perma.cc/4RU2-EULW; Wald, supra
note 374, at 719–23.
457 Coker, 902 F.2d at 89; see also WEAL II, 906 F.2d at 748 (quoting same phrase
from Coker); Sunstein, supra note 363, at 660–61 (describing Supreme Court’s “skepticism
about the appropriateness of judicial supervision of the regulatory process at the behest
of statutory beneficiaries” as manifested in decisions like Allen and Heckler).
458 Council of & for the Blind, 709 F.2d at 1533.
459 Ceballos et al., supra note 6, at 48.
460 See, e.g., WEAL II, 906 F.2d at 752 (characterizing the constitutional issue as
simply a procedural failing by the agency); Council of & for the Blind, 709 F.2d at 1533–
34 (same).
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involving intentional race and national origin discrimination in
federally funded programs, existing Fifth Amendment jurisprudence formally barred federal aid. But courts viewed attempts to
force the federal government to implement Title VI as if they had
nothing to do with the Constitution’s substance. Instead, they described these statutes as simply another tool for the federal government to use in enforcing civil rights.461 They do not seem to
have understood the federal government as a longstanding violator of civil rights with constitutional obligations of its own. And it
is quite likely, as Ceballos, Engstrom, and Ho suggest, that many
judges believed that enforcing the civil rights statutes against
funding recipients did offer a sufficient remedy—a belief reinforced by their view of the federal government as promoting civil
rights rather than violating them.462
Some litigants may have contributed to the dynamic by forgoing constitutional claims or characterizing the Fifth Amendment rights at stake as merely procedural ones.463 They may have
emulated earlier litigation without realizing its background or
carefully mirroring those suits’ substantive Fifth Amendment arguments. The long-running litigation that began as Adams v.
Richardson and ended in WEAL II also played a role in foregrounding procedure, insofar as the district court’s long-term
oversight of the Department of Education centered on mandating
how the agency would process discrimination complaints—fueling the sense that any constitutional issue was simply one of procedure, not substance.464
As a result, an oversimplified, sanitized understanding of the
federal role took over. That understanding erased the federal government’s long-term use of its vast fiscal power to support Jim
Crow and the constitutional principle that emerged in response.
Such gaps in memory are understandable. The civil rights
movement’s struggle against state and local governments was
vivid and obvious. However, the hard-fought lobbying and litigation campaign against federal support for segregation—where the
Fifth Amendment norm took shape—was less visible, occurring
as much in congressional offices and executive agencies as in the
461

See, e.g., WEAL II, 906 F.2d at 747.
Ceballos et al., supra note 6, at 50.
463 See, e.g., Brief for Appellants at 41, Council of & for the Blind, 709 F.2d 1521
(No. 81-13890) (describing the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claim as involving the legal
right to prompt action on their administrative complaints).
464 See WEAL II, 906 F.2d at 744–47 (recounting the history of the litigation and describing it as a “suit[ ] directly against federal enforcement authorities for tardigrade administration of antidiscrimination prescriptions”).
462
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courts.465 In observers’ minds, once the federal government became (at least episodically) committed to civil rights enforcement,
that role subsumed its actions in supporting segregation. The battle to impose constitutional constraints on federal support for discrimination fell away, and a sense of federal culpability faded.
It is ironic that civil rights groups’ triumphs in enacting statutes like Title VI may have helped obscure the underlying constitutional norm. Professors William Eskridge and John Ferejohn
have argued that “superstatutes” like the Civil Rights Act of 1964
perform better as a means of implementing fundamental norms
than judicial interpretation of the constitutional text.466 The longterm struggle to establish the Fifth Amendment no-aid principle—and its uneven success as manifested in statutory codification and constitutional slippage—raises questions about the relationship between codification and the Constitution. Should
advocates worry that statutes may displace or degrade the status
of underlying constitutional norms?
Some might argue that the no-aid principle never truly crystallized as an enforceable, enduring legal constraint on the federal government; rather, only the more limited statutory framework of Title VI and its analogues did. But through the early
1980s, courts universally spoke of the Fifth Amendment mandate
as if it had teeth—as real constitutional law. Civil rights lawyers
could reasonably understand that they established clear constitutional principles, ones that formally remain good law even now.
That the black-letter law has become unenforceable rests on the
judiciary’s recent evolution toward a more restrictive view of courts’
role, an evolution that was politically constructed and thus quite
contingent. The no-aid principle might have endured had federal
judges not constructed procedural barriers to its enforcement.
The existence of Title VI and its analogues thus seems to
have resulted in a type of statutory displacement that facilitated
a process of constitutional forgetting. Once the federal government became institutionally committed to civil rights, through
the formal statutory framework as well as institutional bodies set
up within agencies to enforce Title VI, it was easy to think of any

465 See generally 4 THE PAPERS OF CLARENCE MITCHELL JR., 1951–1954 (Denton L.
Watson et al. eds., 2010) (describing the work of the NAACP’s chief lobbyist in urging
legislators and administrators to cease support for discrimination); see also generally
DENTON L. WATSON, LION IN THE LOBBY: CLARENCE MITCHELL, JR.’S STRUGGLE FOR THE
PASSAGE OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS (1990) (detailing Mitchell’s career).
466 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN A. FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE
NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 6–9, 16–19 (2010)
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underlying constitutional problems as resolved—and eventually
to forget that the violations had ever occurred.
B. Avoiding Hard Questions About Liberal Landmarks.
For conservatives, judicial nonenforcement of the Fifth
Amendment readily accords with their core principles. However,
for liberals, such nonenforcement is more fraught. Relinquishing
a constitutional principle that demands nondiscrimination
throughout the administrative state seems a difficult choice. But
even beyond the reasons for liberal doubt highlighted above, there
are reasons to think that engaging the Fifth Amendment principle would present special hurdles for liberals. Doing so could force
them to grapple with significant compromises and tensions
within legal liberalism’s crowning achievements. Now, as in the
past, constitutional silence allows such questions to be avoided.
To begin with, liberals have traditionally understood the New
Deal as a landmark success that allowed the national government
to take a role in regulation and social provision that previously
had been reserved to the states. It brought about significant
growth in the administrative state and of national capacity to ensure the “general welfare” by protecting the poor and working
class from some of the vicissitudes of the market economy. However, that achievement required liberals to shed their theoretical
commitment to the Reconstruction Amendments’ racial equality
norm. With southern Democrats as the lynchpin of the New Deal
coalition, many Spending Clause programs were enacted only on
the condition that they give free space to racial segregation and
discrimination.467
Liberals have never sufficiently grappled with the extent to
which those compromises taint the accomplishments of the New
Deal state. Arguably, the history of federal participation in Jim
Crow requires the federal government to redouble its efforts toward
ensuring social security for all while making up the racial gaps in
wellbeing and wealth that resulted from the programs of the past.
That is what the Fifth Amendment norm itself suggests. But
in an era when some have questioned the very existence of the
administrative state, an attempt to deepen its reach while paying

467 See, e.g., KATZNELSON, supra note 26, at 18–23; KING, supra note 10, at 20–27;
LIEBERMAN, supra note 26, at 7–9; QUADAGNO, supra note 26, at 20–21; Katznelson et al.,
supra note 26, at 283, 297 & n.32.
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special attention to the racial inequality it has created might feel
especially politically perilous.468
Another unsettling issue for liberals relates to the Warren
Court’s constitutional civil rights and liberties revolution, also a
key part of liberalism’s advances during the twentieth century.
That constitutional campaign of judicial review on behalf of “discrete and insular minorities” has left an equivocal legacy.469 In
subsequent decades, observers questioned whether judicial decisions could provide fundamental or sustainable social reform—
and whether decisions like Brown were ultimately meaningful.470
During that time, many liberals turned away from the Constitution as a foundation for legal reforms, instead envisioning legislation or executive action as a surer path toward addressing inequality.471 It is no accident that liberals changed their stance
during a period when the judiciary became conservative and the
Warren Court’s constitutional innovations were halted or even
rolled back.
Liberals remain conflicted about whether to subscribe to the
Constitution as an ultimate, unquestionably legitimate framework because they often have seen it used to limit and block their
favored initiatives, whether in the early twentieth century’s Lochner era or under the late twentieth century’s Rehnquist Court.
Tying themselves to the Fifth Amendment no-aid norm as a judicially enforceable principle would again raise the dilemma:
Should liberals be attached to the Constitution itself, or only to
its use when it forwards their favored reforms? Are they willing
to fully endorse constitutional interpretation and enforcement, on
the premise that the best reading of the Constitution will eventually win out, even if they risked seeing conservatives use a no-aid
rule to invalidate federal support for progressive initiatives seeking race or gender equity? In the Fifth Amendment context, it has
proved simplest to avoid those questions rather than embrace the
Constitution regardless of consequences.
Finally, the Fifth Amendment no-aid norm highlights uncomfortable truths regarding the Civil Rights Act of 1964. That Act,

468 See generally, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?
(2014); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1231 (1994).
469 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
470 See generally, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1993); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education
and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
471 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 466, at 6–9.
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along with the Voting Rights Act of 1965472 and the Fair Housing
Act of 1968, secured the “Second Reconstruction” and the civil
rights revolution of the 1960s.473 But it is easy to forget that the
Act could only be passed over the objections of an undemocratic
South, forcing compromises with conservatives and leaving some
of its provisions weaker than they might otherwise have been.474
On its surface, Title VI of the Act, which embodied the Fifth
Amendment no-aid norm, seems to be a provision that did not suffer significant dilution.475
But Title VI was equivocal in one key aspect. As discussed
above, the proponents suggested that Title VI might embody a
Fifth Amendment obligation of the federal government, but they
did not unreservedly embrace that theory.476 That was likely because the courts had not yet coalesced behind such a Fifth Amendment no-aid principle and because doing so could have alienated
some legislators.477 Given that describing Title VI as a constitutional obligation was unnecessary for passage or to ensure its validity, the matter could be left unsettled. However, codifying the
statute at a time when the underlying constitutional norm was
not crystallized left it malleable: open to revision and open to
reimagining as simply a means—rather than an obligation— for
federal officials to police others’ civil rights compliance.
For liberals, debating the Fifth Amendment no-aid principle
on the merits would foreground the uncomfortable truth that the
1964 Act represented only a partial victory, securing some (but
not all) of what civil rights advocates sought. Given that the Act
now appears as a high-water mark for liberalism, acknowledging
how partial its achievements were—in Title VI as in other
aspects—is a dispiriting prospect.
Letting the Fifth Amendment no-aid norm remain inert amid
procedural barriers allows liberals to avoid these difficult realities.
But, as I argue in the next Section, silencing the constitutional
norm without a full reckoning has come at a high price.
472

Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301–10702).
See J. Skelly Wright, Promises to Keep, 3 BLACK L.J. 106, 109 (1973) (“The Second
Reconstruction reached its apex with passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.”); John B. Turner & Whitney M. Young, Jr., Who Has the Revolution
or Thoughts on the Second Reconstruction, 94 DAEDALUS 1148, 1149–54 (1965) (considering the conditions needed for a true civil rights “revolution” to occur).
474 See, e.g., SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND
PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE UNITED STATES 94–128 (2010) (detailing legislative negotiations and compromises written into Title VII of the Act).
475 See Singer et al., supra note 46, at 832–41 (describing evolution of Title VI).
476 See supra note 163.
477 See supra Part II.A; supra Part III.
473
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C. The Costs of Constitutional Silence.
Some costs have been inflicted on the law itself. Losing sight
of the Fifth Amendment has distorted courts’ interpretation of the
civil rights framework. Current doctrine allows federal agencies
unchecked discretion in their use of the Spending Clause powers
because it is nearly impossible to sue federal actors directly
should they choose to fund discriminatory programs.478 The procedural impasse also makes it exceedingly difficult to use the
Fifth Amendment as a legal basis for demanding structural remedies for past discrimination in Spending Clause programs—as
the Thompson plaintiffs discovered.
Silencing a constitutional principle through procedural
means has additional insidious effects for the polity as a whole.
Constitutional debate has been shortchanged. New Deal courts
approved the extension of federal powers via Spending Clause
programs, but the courts have never adequately addressed how
much constitutional responsibility the government bears for
those federally authorized and funded programs. Neither legal
actors nor the broader public has deliberated over or resolved
the fundamental problem of ensuring that sweeping national
programs abide by equal protection norms. At the same time, the
history of civil rights struggles that produced the Fifth Amendment
no-aid principle has been sidelined, and the federal role in
producing a racially segregated, unequal nation remains poorly
understood.
The reality is that the federal government creates national
regimes, institutions, and patterns of life. After the New Deal allowed it to further unlock that power via the Spending Clause,
federal authority went unregulated by the Reconstruction
Amendments for far too long. The sweep of national social programs helped create the segregated society and the massive racial
gap in wealth and wellbeing that continues to rend the nation.479
Federal authority in the present is still more sweeping, and its
ability to underwrite entrenched inequality only greater.

478 Ceballos, Engstrom, and Ho identify an important additional cost to the line of
D.C. Circuit cases foreclosing APA review: Policies causing disproportionate harms to racial minorities cannot be challenged using the APA’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard,
even though disproportionate harms to other groups do merit such APA review, creating
what they term “disparate limbo” for civil rights plaintiffs. See Ceballos et al., supra note
6, at 7.
479 See supra notes 7, 10, 25–26; see also THOMAS SHAPIRO, TATJANA MESCHEDE & SAM
OSORO, INST. ON ASSETS & SOC. POL’Y, THE ROOTS OF THE WIDENING RACIAL WEALTH GAP:
EXPLAINING THE BLACK-WHITE ECONOMIC DIVIDE (2013), https://perma.cc/A3NP-M4SZ.
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The no-aid principle thus offers a needed check on sprawling
federal power to remake national patterns of life. Its remedial implications are even more critical. In the present, national attention is again centered on the innumerable ways that the state
takes, devalues, and limits Black people’s lives.480 The physical
communities and institutions that the federal government helped
construct throughout the twentieth century lie at the root of that
racial subordination, segregation, and systematic oppression.
The federal government has never been truly called to account for its own culpability in that reality. The brief burst in the
late 1960s and 1970s of what officials then called “affirmative action”—meant broadly to encompass any positive acts toward undoing and redressing past racial exclusion—cannot realistically
be understood as addressing federal complicity.481 Such programs
were of limited scale and impact and were subsequently curtailed
by the conservative movement’s success in establishing constitutional colorblindness constraints.482
Even as symbolic acts, such steps fall short. Federal remedial
actions are almost never grounded in clear truth telling about the
federal role in deepening racial inequality and federal actors’ own
constitutional wrongdoing.483 Instead, the federal government has
enjoyed the benevolent aura of a civil rights ally, assumed to
generally be on the right side of history if sometimes late to the
struggle.
That narrative reflects the broader public’s uneven recall of
history, but it also fits the federal courts’ treatment of the federal
government and its constitutional responsibility. By letting the
Fifth Amendment no-aid principle dissipate, while erecting overwhelming obstacles to its enforcement, the judiciary has erased

480 See, e.g., Jamil Smith, The Power of Black Lives Matter, ROLLING STONE (June 16,
2020), https://perma.cc/BUM7-V43G; Mychal Denzel Smith, Incremental Change Is a
Moral Failure, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 2020), https://perma.cc/5NCE-3PN6.
481 See, e.g., James R. Dunn, Title VI, the Guidelines and School Desegregation in the
South, 53 VA. L. REV. 42, 44–45, 73 (1967) (discussing how Southern officials felt “no duty
to take affirmative action to desegregate the schools”).
482 See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
EFFORT—A REASSESSMENT 3–4 (1973) [hereinafter USCCR, REASSESSMENT]; U.S.
COMM’N ON C.R., FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT 134, 156–62, 226–40
(1970) [hereinafter USCCR, FEDERAL]; QUADAGNO, supra note 26, at 20–21. For colorblindness doctrine, see, for example, Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227
(1995) (ruling that federal race-conscious remedial programs are subject to strict scrutiny).
483 The USDA’s historic settlements of lending discrimination claims by Black, Native
American, and Latinx farmers offer a rare, but only partial exception. See generally Stephen
Carpenter, The USDA Discrimination Cases: Pigford, In re Black Farmers, Keepseagle,
Garcia, and Love, 17 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 1 (2012).
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federal constitutional responsibility for the enduring nature of
Jim Crow throughout the nation.
D. Reckoning with the Fifth Amendment
We should remember the forgotten Fifth Amendment struggles and the legal principle they produced and, in doing so, reopen
critical questions of federal constitutional responsibility. None of
us should be able to skirt the difficult questions that the past misuse of Spending Clause powers provokes or those that persist regarding how to ensure nondiscrimination throughout the extended set of Spending Clause programs.
I do not attempt to resolve those intricate questions of substantive constitutional law, remediation, and institutional capacity here; doing so is the work of a full article in itself. This Article
instead has focused on recovering the history of contestation over
these questions. Below, I briefly suggest paths toward airing those
issues in ways that might trigger robust, transparent consideration.
How could substantive debates on the Fifth Amendment be reopened? How might the history underlying the Fifth Amendment
no-aid principle be recalled and potential redress considered?
1. Litigation and legislation.
One way to revive consideration of the constitutional no-aid
principle would be for civil rights advocates to raise it in litigation, seeking to overcome the procedural barriers that currently
exist. Litigation might seek to challenge any federal policies currently allowing funds to flow to entities engaging in systemic discrimination.484 Further, one might also bring remedial suits like
Thompson—alleging that the federal government approved and
funded systemic race discrimination in the past and still bears
the responsibility to dismantle the vestiges of that segregation.
For advocates, it would be crucial to frame such challenges as
enforcing the federal government’s own substantive constitutional obligations under the Fifth Amendment so that the challenge is not simply to the federal government’s decisions as to how
to police the civil rights compliance of others. Rather, the claim
would be that the federal government itself runs afoul of its
484 One obvious target might be federal funding for local police departments with documented patterns of racial profiling and violence. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959
F. Supp. 2d 540, 660–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding constitutional violations in racial profiling by the New York Police Department); Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822, 899–
905 (D. Ariz. 2013) (finding constitutional violations in racial profiling by the Maricopa
County, Arizona, sheriff’s office), aff’d in relevant part, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015).
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constitutional duties when it knowingly funds others’ discrimination. That framing could help to overcome current procedural
barriers, which rest on the theory that the federal government
may freely allow discrimination in the programs it authorizes,
oversees, and subsidizes as a matter of ordinary “enforcement discretion.”485 Even if such suits proved unsuccessful, they would
help to raise consciousness about the significance of the Fifth
Amendment for Spending Clause programs, past and present.
Congress itself could help ensure a full airing of such suits if
it were to directly codify a private right of action to enforce the
no-aid norm against the federal government. It could easily do so
within Title VI and the other Spending Clause statutes.486 A statutory approach would also allow Congress to tailor and limit private enforcement of the no-aid principle, thereby addressing concerns that opening the door to such litigation would overwhelm
federal agencies or the federal courts. As with litigation, even the
act of introducing and debating such legislation could be a powerful
means to break the current silence regarding the Fifth Amendment,
regardless of the legislation’s ultimate success.
2. Administrative structure.
Congress could go still further to force consideration of the
no-aid norm into the mainstream, by restructuring the coordination and implementation of the Spending Clause civil rights statutes across the entire administrative state. A deep literature suggests that structural design is a key means to entrench political

485 By showing that the federal government is not simply withholding enforcement
action but actively supplying funds enabling discrimination to continue, advocates might
overcome the Heckler presumption that “inaction” is not reviewable under the APA. As
Judge Marvin Garbis reasoned in Thompson, rejecting the Heckler argument, an agency
overseeing its funding recipients often will be “act[ing] affirmatively, funding and providing operational support for [state or local] initiatives,” thus becoming “a collaborator in
the production and administration of [ ] policy.” 348 F. Supp. 2d at 421–22. That is a far
cry from an agency’s mere decision not to enforce an ordinary civil liability regime. By
making clear that it is the federal government’s own constitutional obligations that are at
issue, plaintiffs could also push back against the theory that there are sufficient remedies
to be found by suing those receiving the funding. Contra Council of & for the Blind, 709
F.2d at 1534. Suits against funding recipients are not “adequate” and should not preclude
APA review because they do not address the legal violation at issue when the federal government chooses to subsidize discrimination as a matter of policy or broad practice.
486 Cf. Council of & for the Blind, 709 F.2d at 1531 n.69 (stating that “by 1976 Congress knew how to create suits directly against a federal agency which failed to carry out
its statutorily imposed duties” and citing examples).
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designers’ goals over the long term.487 Federal agencies subject to
Title VI and its analogues presently all have civil rights offices
dedicated to processing discrimination complaints and otherwise
assuring compliance. The Justice Department serves in a coordinating role, attempting to bring greater coherence to this federal
civil rights machinery.488 But the DOJ’s ability to do this is often
characterized as limited.489 In fact, the most notable feature
of civil rights enforcement in the national government is how
fragmented it is.
A structural goal for the Fifth Amendment no-aid principle
might be to create a centralized, more powerful actor with responsibility for overseeing federal compliance across the administrative state.490 Creating a powerful institutional entity would help
ensure that agencies, other policymakers, and the broader public
fully consider the ways in which federal authority and constitutional nondiscrimination obligations interact.
3. Social movements and broader public understandings.
Movements for racial justice—from large national organizations to grassroots activists—might also draw upon the history of
struggle against federal aid for discrimination, and the Fifth
Amendment itself. Doing so could force a larger public reckoning
with the federal government’s constitutional responsibilities.
Very strong constitutional precedent, along with clear historical evidence, indicate that the federal government violated the
Fifth Amendment for many decades.491 Equally clear precedent
indicates that the government has an obligation to undo the harms
it created.492 That legacy of Brown II, Green, and Swann is a
487 For an overview, see Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 333, 339–42 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne
Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010).
488 See Exec. Order No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (Nov. 4, 1980) (directing the
Attorney General to coordinate Title VI, Title IX, and Section 504 enforcement).
489 E.g., USCCR, REASSESSMENT, supra note 482, at 97; USCCR, FEDERAL, supra
note 482, at 1059–60.
490 Under President Lyndon Johnson, early efforts were made to coordinate federal
civil rights efforts from a presidential committee, but those quickly ended. See Singer et al.,
supra note 46, at 857–60; see also id. at 862–77 (arguing for better coordination of Title VI
enforcement); Charles M. Lamb, Administrative Coordination in Civil Rights Enforcement,
31 VAND. L. REV. 855, 857–59 (1978) (same). More recently, Marianne Engelman Lado has
forcefully argued for centralizing civil rights enforcement in the executive branch. See
Marianne Engelman Lado, No More Excuses: Building a New Vision of Civil Rights Enforcement in the Context of Environmental Justice, 22 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 281, 327–30 (2019).
491 See supra Part II; supra Part III. For historical examples, see Plessy Preserved,
supra note 25, at 951–1003; Subsidizing Segregation, supra note 25, at 876–913.
492 See supra Part II.D.
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responsibility that does not fall simply upon state and local actors;
it also rests on the federal government and remains unfulfilled.
That is the single most significant aspect of the Fifth Amendment history recounted here. Most people still do not think of the
federal government as having engaged in systemic undermining
of the Reconstruction Amendments in the way that southern (and
northern) states did in the past. Nor do they think of the federal
government as directly culpable for segregation in an actionable
way, one giving rise to serious remedial obligations.
Remembering the struggle to end federal support for segregation and the constitutional principle it produced offers a way to
show the public the true significance of past federal actions—and
the legal responsibility that ensues. To frame the federal government as having violated the Constitution, systematically and for
decades, changes the frame for how we understand and respond
to the present. For activists to recall the prior struggle to halt the
federal government’s involvement in segregation and draw upon
the constitutional norm it articulated might further fuel the already existing and increasingly strong movement to address deep
racial subordination in this country.
Would calling upon and debating constitutional history—and
the Constitution itself—produce racial progress and redress? Reason for hope exists, but, of course, no one can know the ultimate
outcome. Reckoning with the Fifth Amendment carries risks. But
the concerns that drove the constitutional principle into obscurity
are best addressed in the open and on the merits rather than
avoided. Remembering is the initial step.
CONCLUSION
Civil rights advocates long fought to limit the use of federal
power and funds to propel racial segregation and exclusion. They
used the Constitution as a tool in doing so, arguing that the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause barred the inequitable use of
the nation’s resources to benefit only some. Over time, they
succeeded in convincing courts that equal protection principles
applied equally to states and the federal government and that
such principles barred knowing support for segregation. Congress
legislated a statutory version of that principle in Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.
For a brief period, the no-aid principle flourished, recognized
by the federal courts as “clearly established” black-letter law that
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constrained the national government.493 However, by the 1980s,
the principle began to dissipate for lack of enforceability. Suits to
challenge federal involvement in discrimination began to face difficult obstacles in doctrines relating to standing, implied private
rights of action, and APA review. Litigants found the courtroom
door closing.
The rationales for turning away such suits suggested that
judges and litigants had forgotten the reasons Title VI and similar statutes were enacted—to end a constitutional dilemma over
federal responsibility for funding segregation. Instead, courts
characterized the statutory framework as simply another tool for
federal officials to stop civil rights violations by others, forgetting
the Fifth Amendment backdrop. Courts also expressed their unwillingness to police the executive branch’s approach to civil
rights, arguing that they need not “oversee the overseer.”
Procedural obstacles should not be allowed to silence the constitutional norm. The Fifth Amendment ideal should be remembered and revived so that the nation can once again consider the
profound questions of federal constitutional responsibility that it
invokes. To avoid those inquiries, no matter how overwhelming
they may seem, distorts historical memory and blocks necessary
deliberations regarding fundamental norms. Our society remains
structured by the apartheid that the federal Spending Clause
power once entrenched. Recovering the Fifth Amendment norm
forces us to ask whether the Constitution requires us to remedy
that longstanding system of racial caste.

493

Nat’l Black Police Ass’n v. Velde, 712 F.2d 569, 580 (1983).

